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I. INTRODUCTION
A. AREA OF RESEARCH
The United States Code requires that a warranty be
included in all procurement contracts for major weapon
systems. As further defined in the Department of Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), the
Government will no longer act as self-insurer for the
performance characteristics of the systems it buys and, as
such, must implement the necessary administrative
infrastructure to develop, apply and administer the process
in a cost effective manner. While the DFARS language talks
to the major systems, the implementation of widespread
warranty coverage will have dramatic implications in the
area of spare part procurements and how they will interact
in the acquisition environment. This thesis concerns the
principal problems regarding the application of warranty
provisions to the acquisition of spare parts and how these
problems might be resolved.
B. DISCUSSION
The use of the warranty provision in Department of
Defense (DOD) acquisition has been sporadically applied
since the early 1960's up to the passage of Title 10,
Section 2403, of the United States Code (herein referred to
as the Code). The passage of the law, and subsequent DOD
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guidance has generated a great deal of concern within the
individual services. Questions such as the following must
be addressed: [Ref. 1: p. iii]
How can complex military equipment be warranted?
How much should a warranty cost (if anything)?
What are the potential benefits?
Can reasonable terms and conditions be developed?
Can a military warranty be administered effectively?
Will industry respond?
Will the military user adapt?
What tools are needed? What tools are available?
The Department of Defense and the individual services
are addressing these types of questions in the development
of policy directives, guidance handbooks and various
instructions that run the gamut in the degree of specific
procedural policy. However, the encompassing range of the
warranty issue, the far-reaching administrative implications
and the "no phase-in" approach to the legislation has left
the military services with an overwhelming challenge.
Various efforts are currently underway to implement the
warranty requirement in the Navy, specifically the Navy
hardware system commands (HSC). However, the wholesale
duplication of the efforts for spare parts procurements must
be carefully examined. The nature of the life-cycle
inventory and the consumer use of spares requires specific
language in the use of express warranties. For example,
development of the necessary clauses used in the procurement
will have to include essential performance requirements,
duration, marking requirements, and repair and corrective
action responsibilities and remedies.
As such, the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) and
the Navy Field Contracting System (NFCS) as a whole are
faced with numerous choices regarding the application of the
warranty towards the acquisition of spare parts. Recently
released guidance from the Secretary of the Navy provides
little guidance in narrowing the problems as defined to
spares. It is hoped that a complete enumeration of the
issues involved can lend towards a policy of effective
warranty management at the spare parts level.
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The main objectives of this thesis are as follows:
1. Discuss the background of current warranty policy.
2. Investigate efforts underway in the Navy to implement
the warranty requirement.
3. Investigate the warranty policy as it applies to the
acquisition of spare parts.
4. Enumerate the major issues concerning the relationship
of spare parts warranties and major systems
warranties.
5. Investigate the spare parts warranty issue as it
relates to the NAVSUP competition initiatives.
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is as follows:
What are the principal problems regarding the application
of warranty provisions to the acquisition of spare parts
and how might these problems be resolved?
Subsidiary research questions are as follows:
1. What are the current warranty requirements and
provisions for spare parts procurements?
2. What problems have been and could be encountered in
applying the use of warranties to spare part
procurements?
3. Under what circumstances could the warranty
requirement for spare parts procurement be waived?
4. What problems involved in the administration of
warranties must be recognized in the development and
use of warranty clauses?
5. What implication does the Navy Breakout Program have
on the process of using warranties in spare parts
procurement?
6. What specific steps can be taken to address the
problems encountered by the Navy Field Contracting
System in resolving warranty issues and problems?
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The basic research for this thesis was developed from a
comprehensive study of current literature and from informal
interviews with personnel directly involved with the
warranty issue at the following commands and groups:
1. Selected members of the Navy Warranty Ad Hoc Group
2. Naval Supply System Command
3. Naval Air Systems Command
4. Naval Sea Systems Command
11
5. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics)
6. Ships Parts Control Center
7. Aviation Supply Office
8. Joint Cruise Missile Project Office
9. U.S. Air Force Product Performance Agreement Center.
Literature was obtained from the Naval Postgraduate
School Library, Defense Technical Information Center,
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange, Product
Performance Agreement Center and the Defense Systems
Management College. Additional regulations, directives, and
instructions that concern the warranty process were obtained
from applicable commands as referenced.
Appendix A provides a list of individuals who either
were interviewed or provided information for this research
effort.
F. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The general direction of the thesis is to provide a
brief overview of the contractual issues of current warranty
policy as it relates to the acquisition of spare parts. It
deals with the U.S. Navy and is tailored to explore the
ramifications on the Naval Supply Systems Command and the
Navy Field Contracting System; specifically the Ships Parts
Control Center and Aviation Supply Office. It will
investigate the current general direction of the
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development, application, and administration issues as they
impact the spares acquisition process.
The warranting of major systems will be discussed for
the purposes of investigating the relationship between
weapon systems and spares. However, an in depth analysis
will focus on the spares issues only. Administration of
warranties will also be discussed but only to further
enumerate the vastness of the issues involved. A detailed
cost-effectiveness analysis of applying the performance
warranty to spare parts is recognized to be an important
research area but outside the scope of this thesis. No
attempt was made to investigate the use of warranties in the
shipbuilding or ship overhaul environment.
The relative newness of the performance warranty
requirement has been a limiting factor in the research
effort. Aside from the legislation itself and language
contained in DFARS, there is little formal policy within the
Navy regarding the institutionalization of the weapon system
warranty and its relationship to the spare parts issue.
The warranty problem as it relates to NAVSUP, the Ships
Parts Control Center, and Aviation Supply Office has been
primarily relegated to the technical divisions. Contracting
offices' concerns were largely limited to the legality of
clause development and enforcement; and the hampering of the
acquisition process due to new demands on the negotiating
process.
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This research makes the presumption that the enactment
of the legislation and the subsequent DOD policy statement
(as delineated in DFARS ) is not at issue. It also assumes
that the issues enumerated herein are taken in consequence
of a completed cost-benefit analysis. Additionally, this
study assumes that the reader has a general knowledge of
Department of Defense contracting language and the Defense
acquisition process.
G. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this study, the following key
definitions are provided. Additional definitions are
presented in Appendix B.
1. Warranty - used in a number of contexts. Its most
restrictive meaning occurs in the traditional
Government contract warranty clause (less frequently
referred to as a Guaranty clause) which simply gives
the government a remedy for patent defects discovered
after acceptance. The reason for including such a
clause is to overcome the finality of acceptance.
Another meaning, the most common commercial use of the
term, is that a warranty is a promise of the seller
regarding the quality of the goods. In this sense the
term is used to determine when a defect exists
rather than to provide a remedy for the defect.
[Ref. 2: p. 614]
2. Material and Workmanship - designed to provide an
incentive for the contractor to consistently produce a
weapon system that conforms to all manufacturing
drawings and quality standards. The warranty is most
important during the early periods of production.
[Ref. 3: p. 9]
3. Design and Manufacturing Requirements - the structural
and engineering plans and manufacturing particulars,
including precise measurements, tolerances, materials
and finished product tests for the weapon system being
produced. [Ref. 4: p. 46.7-2]
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4. Weapon System - a system or major subsystem used
directly by the armed forces to carry out combat
missions. By way of illustration, the term "weapon
system" includes, but is not limited to the following,
if intended for use in carrying out combat missions:
tracked and wheeled combat vehicles; self-propelled,
towed and fixed guns, howitzers and mortars;
helicopters; naval vessels. . .[Ref. 4: p. 46.7-3]
A "weapon system," however, does not include the
following: [Ref. 5: p. 2]
a. Support equipment related to the items listed
above, such as ground handling equipment,
training devices and their accessories, or
ammunition (unless an effective warranty for the
weapon system would require inclusion of such
items )
;
b. Commercial items sold in substantial quantities
to the general public;
c. Any system that costs less than $100,000 per
unit or whose eventual total procurement cost is
less than $10,000,000;
d. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contracts (the
Government may, however, obtain warranties
requested by an FMS purchaser if a mutually
satisfactory price and arrangement can be
negotiated )
.
5. Assurance Warranty - a warranty form consistent with
10 USC 2403 that is designed to assure that minimum
required design, quality, and performance levels are
achieved. There is no built-in incentive for the
contractor to exceed minimum levels.
6. Incentive Warranty - a warranty form that provides
incentives for the contractor to exceed minimum
design, quality, or performance levels.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II presents basic background information on
warranties; pertinent definitions and coverage of the
specific types of warranties discussed throughout the
thesis. Chapter III examines legislative and regulatory
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policy and requirements related to the warranty concept in
its application within the Department of Defense. Specific
warranty application within the DoD acquisition process is
discussed in Chapter IV. This will be an in depth review of
the issues involved on a macro scale as they pertain to both
major system buys as well as spares procurements. Chapter V
will investigate the specific issues regarding warranty
provisions of spare part procurements. Included are the
ramifications on the competition initiatives underway at
NAVSUP and the NFCS level. Presented will be case studies
of efforts underway to deal with the spares' issues.






This chapter will provide a general overview of the
nature of warranties and discuss the different types from a
conceptual viewpoint. Implied and express warranties will
be introduced along with a presentation of the three types
of warranties required under the current legislation:
essential performance; design and manufacturing; and,
materials and workmanship. The chapter will conclude with a
discussion of the general benefits of the warranty.
B. WARRANTY OVERVIEW
The use of warranties in commercial business transac-
tions has become common place in the United States and
throughout the world. Due to the competitive nature of the
market, buyers receive warranty coverage regardless of
personal choice. Manufacturers of expensive durable goods
use the type of coverage they provide (i.e. duration,
serviceability) as a method of product differentiation.
[Ref. 6: p. 498-499] As such, consumers have come to expect
some type of express warranty provision for almost all
durable goods and view the implicit cost of such
coverage as an integral part of the selling price.
[Ref. 7: p. 1-4]
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In the commercial sector, the early use of product
warranties had primarily been viewed by manufacturers as a
marketing tool. [Ref. 7: p. 1-4] However, the increased
economic significance of the warranty concept has forced
companies to refocus their perceptions. This is
particularly true in light of the increased use of life-
cycle costing techniques. The motivation for increased
product reliability and serviceability is great when the
manufacturer becomes the biggest customer for service of its
own product. [Ref. 7: p. 1-4]
Generally, a warranty is a means by which a manufacturer
assures the customer of the performance of the product
delivered and a method of providing some basic servicing of
the product for a given period after the product is in the
hands of the consumer. [Ref. 7: p. 1-6] It tends to serve
several functions, the most important of which from the
buyer's standpoint is an insurance function or guarantee.
[Ref. 8: p. 38] In so much that the manufacturer's product
price includes a premium for the insurance (albeit
implicitly), a prudent seller must establish clear cut
reliability goals to obtain maximum cost-effectiveness.
In contrast to warranties, service contracts are
optional protection purchased by the consumer and are
significantly different than a warranty. The service
contract is similar to a straight insurance policy, with the
fee paid in advance by the consumer. Warranties involve
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costs to the warrantor only if incurred, but the expected
costs are reflected (to the extent that the market will bear
them) in product prices. Service contracts are priced, that
is to say the manufacturer (or the service offer) expects to
recover costs and profit. Warranties tend to be regarded
primarily as costs that must be recovered. This key
difference points up the fact that the two instruments tend
to generate differing incentives as to product reliability
and serviceability. [Ref. 7: p. 1-7]
Within the confines of the Department of Defense (DoD)
acquisitions, the normal market forces compelling
contractors to offer guarantees and independently strive for
maximum reliability do not exist. [Ref. 9: p. 5-61] Most
procurements involve the two contractual parties in roles as
monopsonist and monopolist. As such, DoD must employ the
necessary stimuli to ensure some minimum reliability
standard is met in the operational environment. This is
accomplished through the use of a contractually binding
warranty arrangement that forces the contractor to meet the
standard or endure the added costs of unanticipated repairs
and replacements. [Ref. 9: p. 5-61]
C. WARRANTY TYPES
To further understand the specific issues involved in
warranty development and application, a discussion of the
basic types of warranties must be presented. These are
19





An implied warranty has two main descriptions: (a)
that the owner maintains title to the product and has the
authority to sell it; (b) that the product meets the
standards of that particular industry and is suitable for
use. [Ref. 10: p. 17] This particular warranty type is
common place in the commercial sector. Whereas express
warranties come into existence by virtue of the bargaining
of the parties, implied warranties come into being as a
matter of law, without any bargaining, and as an integral
part of the business transaction. They are always present
unless clearly disclaimed or negatived. Implied warranties
exist even if a seller is unable to discover the defect
involved or cure it if it could be ascertained. [Ref. 11: p.
438] It imposes a very broad responsibility on the seller
to furnish goods which are at least of average acceptable
quality for the purpose of which they are furnished.
2 Express Warranty
The Uniform Commercial Code does not define express
warranties. Instead, it defines how they are created. An
express warranty is created by (a) an affirmation of fact or
promise made by the seller, (b) a description of the goods,
or (c) a sample or model. [Ref. 12: p. 59] In each case,
there is an express warranty that the product will
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conform--if (a), (b), or (c) is part of the basis of the
agreement. To create an express warranty, the seller does
not have to use formal words such as "warrant" or
"guarantee," nor must he have the specific intention to make
a warranty. An express warranty comes into existence by
virtue of any affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the product and becomes
part of the bargain. These statements by the seller create
an express warranty that the goods will conform to his
affirmation or promise. A distinction is drawn between
statements of fact and promises on the one hand, and
statements of value or commendation on the other. As a
general rule, a mere affirmation of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the opinion of the
seller or his commendation of the goods does not give use to
a warranty. The basic factor is whether the statement is
fact or opinion.
D. ESSENTIAL PERFORMANCE WARRANTIES
Two basic essential performance warranty classification
schemes have been developed to describe alternatives
available to procurement activities. They are assurance and
incentive warranties.
1. Assurance Warranties
The term "assurance warranty" is used when the
primary intent is to assure that minimum design, quality and
performance levels are achieved [Ref. 1: p. 3-1] The buyer
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is not seeking anything more than the contract specifies,
and the warranty concept and terms and conditions do not
provide any incentives for the contractor to do otherwise.
This is the basis of the performance warranty required by
the Code. To establish a performance assurance warranty
there are three critical steps: (a) establishing the
performance level to be guaranteed, (b) establishing the
necessary standards to effectively measure the performance,
and (c) establishing the remedies for failure. [Ref. 12: p.
59] Within the scope of DoD acquisitions, these tasks are
not easy and are exacerbated by the time frame of the
legislation implementation date.
2 . Incentive Warranties
The term "incentive warranty" is used for the type
of warranty that provides incentives for the contractor to
exceed minimum design, quality, or performance levels. For
such a warranty, the contractor (or seller) can adapt a
strategy to just meet the minimum performance levels.
However, the warranty is structured so that the risks of
failing to achieve the minimum levels, or the potential
profit associated with exceeding those levels, will normally
motivate the contractor to try to exceed those levels. This
type of warranty may or may not meet the specified
requirements of the Code. [Ref. 1: p. 3-2]
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3 . Assurance vs Incentive Warranties
The distinction between the two basic forms can be
best illustrated by an example. [Ref. 1: p. 3-2]
. . . Assume that an equipment is to be procured that has
a field Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) requirement of
1,000 hours. For the selected warranty period, the
warranted items are expected to operate for a total of
200,000 hours [assuming the warranty period is the same
for both the assurance and incentive forms of warranty].
Therefore, if the MTBF requirement is met, the total
number of failures expected to occur is 200,000/1,000 =
200.
For an assurance type of warranty, the terms and
conditions may state that all failures beyond 200 that
occur during the warranty period must be repaired by the
contractor at no additional cost to the Government. The
contractor does not benefit from producing equipment with
better than a 1,000-hour MTBF.
. . . Consider an incentive warranty form for the same
example. Suppose the contractor is to provide depot
repair services for this equipment over the warranty
period at a fixed price, which is based on the required
MTBF of 1,000 hours or 200 expected failures. The
contractor, aware of this pending warranty commitment,
realizes that each failure that can be eliminated results
in more profit. The contractor therefore has the incen-
tive to invest in design, production, and quality
assurance to reduce the number of future failures. In
addition, there is an incentive to search for the
existence of pattern failures, and, if a "pattern"-type is
observed early in the deployment phase, to develop a fix
to reduce or eliminate such failures. This type of
warranty is known as a reliability improvement warranty
(RIW) because of the incentivizing features.
E. DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING WARRANTIES
In addition to the basic assurance and incentive forms
of performance warranties, the Code also requires that DoD
obtain a warranty in Design and Manufacturing requirements.
These requirements are the "structural and engineering plans
and manufacturing particulars, including precise
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measurements, tolerances, materials and finished product
tests." [Ref. 4] This type of warranty usually involves a
one-time verification test. It may cover such features as
size, weight, interfaces, power requirements, and material
composition. If the finished product meets the requirements
or specifications then the contractor has met his obliga-
tion.
F. MATERIALS AND WORKMANSHIP WARRANTIES
This type of warranty has long been used by the
Government to control latent defects. A defect is a
condition or characteristic that is not in compliance with
the contract requirements. A latent defect is a defect that
exists at the time of acceptance but does not manifest
itself until sometime after acceptance. [Ref 1: p. 2-1] The
purpose of the warranty clause is to remove uncertainties
regarding latent defects by detailing the conditions under
which a warranty claim can be made, irrespective of the
condition of the product at time of acceptance. The clause
allows for remedial action regardless of type of defect.
G. BENEFITS OF THE WARRANTY
Obtaining warranties for Government procurements is not
without risk to both the Government and the contractor.
However, a properly constructed warranty can fit the scheme
of a "win-win" negotiated agreement. In the case of the
incentive warranty form, the Government is "betting" that
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the added cost of the warranty will provide the necessary
incentive to the contractor to make up those costs in the
design and production phases. The end result being that the
essential performance requirements will be met for the
specified time period. On the other hand, the contractor is
betting that he will meet those requirements with fewer
dollars and end up in a more profitable position. Quality
and performance will thus achieve the win-win scenario.
Generally, the acquisition objective within the
Department of Defense is to ensure that we field the best
equipment possible at least cost to meet the goals of
national defense. The warranty supports that objective by
providing an incentive to the contractor to deliver high
quality, reliable systems. Tangible benefits would include
repair or replacement of defective parts to ensure long term
reliability at minimal risk to the Government. The indirect
benefits manifest themselves in the areas of reliability,
maintainability, supportabi li ty and durabi li ty--the
important "-ility" parameters of the acquisition strategy.
Specific advantages to use of warranty can be
categorized as follows: [Ref. 3: p. 2-1]
• Extended contractor responsibility for field perfor-
mance. The contractor is motivated to design and
produce the item to meet the requirements at initial
production release and to release and to operate as
intended in the field.
• Expected performance, reliability and quality. If the
contractor is committed to perform corrective action for
warranty problems at his own expense, there is strong
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motivation to meet or exceed the levels of performance
on which the warranty price was determined.
• Assured lifecycle costs. When a contractor is motivated
to reduce repair costs in order to minimize liability, a
corresponding reduction of support costs may result.
• Early and rapid resolution of problems. With a
warranty, problem areas receive high visibility and gain
management attention [particularly in the current
environment subsequent to passage of 10 USC 2403]. This
generally results in quick action to solve the problems,
providing additional protection to keep dependent areas
on schedule.
• Incentive for no-cost engineering change proposals. The
contractor may introduce no-cost engineering change
proposals (ECPs) to correct problems in order to reduce
repairs under the warranty.
• Realistic estimates of field performance. If the
contractor is overly optimistic about expected field
performance, warranty funds can be depleted rapidly and
profits will be reduced. A warranty can be a tool for
achieving greater realism in proposals. Engineering
review can be instrumental in assuring such
discrepancies do not exist.
• Improved evaluation of field performance. Early
contractor involvement in the evaluation of field
failures may lead to early development of corrective
action programs.
• Operation and support planning based on actual data.
Where contractor support is part of the warranty, actual
usage data provided to the Government may permit
improved accuracy in acquiring logistics resources
during the transition to maintenance and support that
will be performed by the Government. Support and test
equipment, repair procedures, engineering and
provisioning data will be thoroughly validated and
verified before it is delivered to the Government.
Not all benefits will be realized on each warranteed
acquisition. In fact, unless the warranty is fully
developed into the acquisition plan, expected benefits can
quickly become serious drawbacks. For example, the
contractor- support concept must address the organic
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maintenance issue early on. Transshipment of failed
components cost time and money and reduce the operational
availability of the unit. If and when the transition is
made to organic maintenance, will the expertise be
available? To what degree will reliability suffer during
the learning process? The implicit benefits of the warranty
are not automatic and require a conscientious approach.
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has presented an overview on the basics of
the warranty concept. This broad framework is necessary to
understand the background of the warranty legislation that
will be presented in the next chapter. It is also a
requirement to understand the pertinent issues involved in
the development and application issues discussed in
subsequent chapters. At first glance, the benefits of the
warranty would seem substantial and far outweigh the
problems of implementation and administration. However, an
understanding of the potential benefits will serve to become
a basis for understanding the issues and problems facing the
Navy Field Contracting System in implementing the warranty
requirement as related to the acquisition of spares.
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III. WARRANTY LAW AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY
A. INTRODUCTION
Congressional interest in warranties as a means of
ensuring field performance started with the passage of the
Defense Appropriations Act of 1984. The law, with modifica-
tions, was made permanent by inclusion of the 1985 Warranty
Law in the 1985 Defense Authorization Act. This legislation
has had a profound impact on the Defense acquisition and
logistic processes and remains a controversial topic with
regard to implementation. This chapter will present the
background of this legislation and discuss the subsequent
Department of Defense (DoD) and Navy policy directives.
B. HISTORY OF WARRANTY USE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
In 1965, Ralph Nader authored a best-selling book
entitled Unsafe At Any Speed: The Designed-in Dangers of
the American Automobile , "chronicling glaring deficiencies
in the design and production of a sequence of American
compact cars, the Chevrolet Corvair." [Ref. 13: p. 45] This
book appeared to have reversed the general notion of "Caveat
Emptor" ("buyer beware") and introduced the concept that
corporations have a moral and legal responsibility to
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produce a product which meets the explicit and implicit
expectations of the consumer market. [Ref. 13: p. 45]
Warranties were introduced in earnest into the Defense
Department in the late 1960's as a fallout from
their commercial use in the avionics and airframe industry.
[Ref. 14: p. 335] The widespread use of warranties began to
increase in Defense procurements as they were applied to
more complex system buys and also because many commercial
items purchased by the various logistic agencies came with
some type of warranty provision. Based on a 1979 internal
Department of Defense study, one-third of the 4.1 million
types of items in DoD's inventory were covered by some type
of warranty. [Ref. 10: p. 28]
Specific application began with the development and use
of the Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW). This type of
warranty involves a fixed price commitment that obligates
the contractor to repair or replace, within a specified
period of time, all warranted equipment that fails during
the coverage. [Ref. 8: p. 11] Ideally, this provides the
necessary motivation for the contractor to increase
reliability, in the design and production phases, in order
to decrease his repair warranty costs and maximize his
profits. It is the most common form of the incentive
warranty discussed in Chapter II. In a pure Reliability
Improvement Warranty contract, the contractor is not
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obligated to provide equipment that demonstrates a specified
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). Instead, the price of the
warranty is calculated using an "expected" Mean Time Between
Failure. If the field failure rate rises above the set
level, the contractor begins to lose potential profit as the
increased number of failures increase his repair costs. A
decrease in the realized failure rate will, in the same
manner, decrease his repair costs and increase his profit
position. The contractor is therefore motivated to increase
the Mean Time Between Failure of the equipment as much as
possible, if the realized savings from decreased repair
costs are greater than the cost of improving product
reliability.
After evaluating the Department of Defense use of the
Reliability Improvement Warranty and other efforts used
during the 1970' s, researchers concluded that a properly
structured and implemented warranty program could offer
significant potential for achieving desired operational
performance at reasonable cost. [Ref. 15] This conclusion,
centering on expected cost savings, provided a basis for
extending warranty applications to a broader class of pro-
grams. By the beginning of the 1980' s, the use of warran-
ties in the acquisition of military hardware systems became
a "standard" option, but it was only selectively applied and
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usually required a special effort on the part of the program
office to develop and implement. [Ref. 1: p. 2-2]
In 1978, acquisition initiatives developed by the Air
Force Systems Command included expansion of the use of
warranties in weapons procurement, particularly the Air-
Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), Advanced Medium Range Air-
to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), and various jet engine
procurements. [Ref. 13: p. 60] Additionally, the Air Force
Product Performance Agreement Guide (PPAG) was developed
with the assistance of industry, providing annotated
examples of warranties with descriptions, a discussion of
applicability, measurement of compliance, and advantages and
disadvantages in any particular procurement for a number of
warranty provisions. [Ref. 16: p. A-2]
In December of 1980, the Air Force established the
Product Performance Agreement Center in Dayton, Ohio, with
the goal of serving as a DOD-Industry clearinghouse for
product performance data and analysis. [Ref. 16: p. A-2]
Tasking included updating the Product Performance Agreement
Guide, risk/cost benefit modeling, and general administra-
tive support in warranty endeavors. [Ref. 16: p. A-2]
The Army also began warranty initiatives in 1981. A
directive was issued to establish the policies and pro-
cedures for administration of the Army's newly established
warranty program. [Ref. 13: p. 61] However, a study
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published by the Army Material Systems Analysis Activity
Logistics Studies Office concluded that the regulation was
neither well known nor universally applied. The efforts of
some commands yielded effective results and others did not.
[Ref. 13: p. 61] The study concluded with the following
paragraph that summed up the general Army warranty policy of
the early 1980's: [Ref. 13: p. 62]
. Finally, remember that it is Army policy that
warranties will not be acquired under normal circum-
stances. A warranty will be sought if it cannot be
equitably removed from a commercial item, or if it will
provide a definite benefit to the Army; the decision to
acquire a warranty will be made only if the decision maker
is convinced absolutely that one of the aforementioned
conditions prevail.
While the Army policy was clearly stated regarding the
warranty issue, this position of warranty-avoidance was not
unique. Interviews have indicated that as the ramifications
of warranty administration became clear, many agencies
throughout DoD, closer to the end-user of the warranted
item, felt that the costs exceeded any derived benefits in
every case. Coupled with the inherent policy of the
Government as "self-insurer", this attitude impeded any full
scale development of the warranty throughout the Defense
Department in the early 1980's.
During this timeframe, there was an effort by the
Defense Acquisition Regulatory (DAR) Council to improve the
Defense Acquisition Regulation guidance in warranty applica-
tion and administration. [Ref. 13: p. 62] The changes
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proposed were considered reactive to the general feeling
among DoD field contracting activities that warranty
guidance was greatly inadequate in terms of administration.
Proposed new language discussed included: [Ref. 17: p. A-25]
• When to employ a warranty
• The use of billback terms (reimbursement by the contrac-
tor for a covered claim repaired by the Government or a
third party)
• Command designated warranty control personnel with the
primary responsibility for administering warranties and
warranty claims.
C. CURRENT WARRANTY LAW
1 . Overview
Senator Mark Andrews of North Dakota offered the
initial warranty provision from the floor as an amendment to
the fiscal year 1984 Department of Defense Appropriation
Act. His argument for the proposed legislation centered on
requiring defense contractors to warrant products the
Government purchases, just as John Deere warranted a tractor
Andrews had purchased from that company. [Ref. 13: p. 63]
Senator Andrews had drafted the proposal as early as
mid-July in 1983 and had provided it to various industry
groups for review. [Ref. 13: p. 63] The following comments
regarding the proposal are taken from an internal memorandum
of a major aerospace prime contractor and are not atypical
of the defense industry: [Ref. 13: p. 63]
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As a generalization, the proposed amendment is so hope-
lessly out of phase with economic reality, good contract-
ing practice and common sense that it is impossible even
to begin to suggest changes that might make the amendment
more administrable.
[Notable deficiencies included:]
• the application of performance warranties to low
volume productions of low maturity items
• the fact that the law would require modification of
numerous existing contracts
• that placing a requirement on cost type contracts for
the contractor to bear all the costs of repair or
replacement effectively eliminates such contracts
• that "performance requirements" frequently change over
the life of the weapon system
• that contractors would be unwilling to warrant a
design over which it had no control.
While lengthy discussions ensued between the Senator
and selected industry representatives, no substantial
changes were made to the proposal. Senator Andrews believed
that this legislation and other legislative initiatives
would force DoD to change acquisition behaviors and "begin
to act more like commercial buyers." [Ref. 13: p. 65]
Industry as a whole, however, put up little struggle
to fight the warranty issue. The timing just was not right.
After repeated blows from the press concerning spare part
pricing abuses, defense contractors were not willing to be
publicly accused of hindering Congressional acquisition
reforms. [Ref. 13:64]
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The Department of Defense also testified periodi-
cally over the issue, but was hampered by an additional
problem. At the time, there were well over one hundred
pieces of acquisition-related legislation being introduced.
Without hard-core evidence to bolster their defense against
the warranty issue, DoD deferred and set off in search of
"bigger windmills". [Ref. 13: p. 65]
2 . Current Warranty Law
With the signing of the 1984 Appropriations Act,
written warranties (the statutory language uses the word
guarantee and warranty interchangeably) became a requirement
in contracts for major weapon systems. Section 794 of the
Act states: [Ref. 18: p. 154]
No funds. . .may be obligated or expended for the procure-
ment of a weapon system unless the prime contractor or
other contractors for such a system provide the United
States with written guarantees.
On 16 December 1983, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Thayer issued a 90-day blanket waiver of the legisla-
tive requirements to allow DoD sufficient time to clarify
policy and administrative issues. To forestall any Congres-
sional backlash for the waiver, DoD delineated their immedi-
ate concerns to Senator Andrews in a memorandum. [Ref. 19]
These included:
• potential requirement for pedigreed parts
• impact on component breakout
• impact on small business
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• structure of the flowdown procedures
• potential to impact field maintenance capabilities
• potential for delays to contracts currently being
negotiated
• potential inhibition of technological innovation
• difficulty in determining credible reliability data
On 20 January 1984, DoD issued its draft implementa-
tion guidance in the Federal Register. The feedback was
overwhelming. Almost 200 point papers were received from
numerous contractors, small businesses, and special interest
groups. [Ref. 13: p. 70] While some positive comments were
submitted, most inputs dealt with the restrictive language
of the law and its resultant impact on direct and adminis-
trative costs.
Franz 0. Ohlson, vice president and director of the
Aerospace Industries Association's Procurement and Finance
Council wrote: [Ref. 20: p. 25]
Simply stated, we believe that section 794 [warranty
requirement] is unworkable, cost ineffective and unneces-
sary in view of existing warranty provisions. Section 794
is an attempt to apply commercial warranty practices to
government procurement of weapon systems. While well
intentioned, this effort fails fully to take into account
the special circumstances and restrictions inherent in
military production.
William E. Hardman, president of National Tooling
and Machining Association, stated: [Ref. 20, p. 25]
. . . it would be unfair to require a subcontractor to
provide performance guarantees, and it would force small
and medium-sized firms to stop doing business with the
Defense Department.
36
As the joint DoD-Industry campaign for repeal of the
law began to mount, Congressional support for some type of
relief became apparent. Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Carl
Levin (D-MI) also said they were concerned about the impact
of the law on small businesses without sufficient reserve
capital to fund the warranty penalties. Additionally,
Senator John Tower (R-TX) expressed his concerns:
[Ref. 20: p. 25]
. there seems to me to be a great problem if we
suddenly demand that defense contractors who have not
designed a particular system stand as insurers that the
Government's design will work. There is an important
difference between a workmanship warranty, which insures
the Government that a system is properly built to whatever
design has been agreed upon, and a performance guarantee,
which deals with whether or not the particular design will
achieve its goals.
Some key lawmakers were having reservations about
the warranty law, realizing that the issue is indeed more
complicated that it may have seemed when Senator Andrews
introduced his amendment. However, 1984 was an election
year and Congress would find it tough to vote for repeal of
a law that was clamping down on the wasteful ways of Defense
acquisition. Additionally, the Defense Department was
equally aware that "pushing too far" might alienate some
Republican Congressmen that were to play a key role
in achieving the President's 1985 defense budget
[Ref. 21: p. 143] As such, DoD accepted revision vice repeal
with some resignation.
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A compromise effort was published on 31 May 1984 as
Section 191 of the Defense Authorization Bill. In addition
to defining those terms key to the statutory language (as
delineated in Chapter I, Section G), the new legislation
addressed the problem regarding small businesses. Exempting
all but the prime contractor, the legislation called for the
traditional system whereby the prime assumes responsibility
for the complete integrated system and obtains warranties
from subcontractors as appropriate.
The risk to the contractor for warranting initial
production items was minimized by requiring a written
guarantee for essential performance only during mature full-
scale production.
An additional key revision, one of the more sig-
nificant to DoD, relaxed the legislative requirement to
report any warranty waivers directly to Congress. The
original language of Section 794 was so stringent that any
waiver developed below the Secretary of Defense level was
virtually impossible to submit for eventual approval.
[Ref: 13: p. 80] The new language allowed for both class
and individual waivers.
Perhaps one of the most important revisions found in
the legislative history involves the "cost-effectiveness"
waiver. No longer regarded as an "extraordinary mechanism",
a waiver request due to "unreasonable costs" is now
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considered "a potential natural result of
conscientious negotiations between DoD and the contractor."
[Ref. 22: p. 246-247]
The revisions to the 1984 Defense Appropriations Act
did not address every issue of the warranty requirement.
Numerous concerns of both DoD and Industry regarding
implementation and administration remained. However, the
compromise for the revisions realized was the extent of
Congressional leeway on the issue. The modified law was
made permanent by inclusion of the 1985 Warranty Law in the
1985 Defense Authorization Act. Formally codified, the
Defense Procurement Reform Act (Public Law 98-525), effec-
tive January 1985, established Title 10, Section 2403 of the
United States Code, entitled "Major Weapon Systems:
Contractor Guarantees" (included as Appendix C).
D. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION WARRANTY POLICY
The requirements of the Warranty Law are specific to the
Department of Defense. Section (h)(2) to the statute states
that "[the law] does not apply to the Coast Guard or to the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration." [Ref. 23] As
such, there has been no specific revision to the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) pertaining to the criteria for
use of warranties. Specific legislative requirements have
been incorporated directly into the Defense Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulation Supplement (DFARS).
39
The use of warranties in general Government acquisition
is straight-forward and recommended only when clearly in the
Government's best interests. The criteria established for
use of the warranty is as follows: [Ref. 23: p. 46.703]
The use of warranties is not mandatory [researcher's
emphasis]. In determining whether a warranty is
appropriate for a specific acquisition, the contracting
officer shall consider the following factors:
1. Nature and use of the supplies and services. This
includes such factors as:
a. Complexity and function;
b. Degree of development?
c. State of the art;
d. End use;
e. Difficulty in detecting defects before acceptance;
and
f. Potential harm to the Government if the item is
defective.
2. Cost. Warranty costs arise from:
a. The contractor's charge for accepting the deferred
liability created by the warranty; and
b. Government administration and enforcement of the
warranty.
3. Administration and enforcement. The Government's
ability to enforce the warranty is essential to the
effectiveness of warranty. There must be some
assurance that an adequate administrative system for
reporting defects exists or can be established. The
adequacy of a reporting system may depend upon such
factors as the:
a. Nature and complexity of the item;
b. Location and proposed use of the item;
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c. Storage time for the item;
d. Distance of the using activity from the source of
the item;
e. Difficulty in establishing existence of defects;
and
f. Difficulty in tracing responsibility for defects.
4. Trade practice. In many instances an item is cus-
tomarily warranted in the trade, and, as a result of
that practice, the cost of an item to the Government
will be the same whether or not a warranty is in-
cluded. In those instances, it would be in the
Government's interest to include such a warranty.
5. Reduced requirements. The contractor's charge for
assumption of added liability may be partially or
completely offset by reducing the Government's
contract quality assurance requirements where the
warranty provides adequate assurance of a satisfactory
product.
Warranty guidance provided in the FAR allowed DoD
program managers to pursue warranties when it was self-
evident that benefits would accrue. Warranties were not
mandatory prior to the current legislation nor are they
mandatory for current procurements specifically exempted in
the statute. One of the major impacts of the law was that
for the first time it required DoD to perform cost-benefit
analysis to demonstrate that the use of a contractually-
binding warranty is not cost-effective. Previously,
analysis was used to support the added cost of a warranty
provision. [Ref. 24]
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E. DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT POLICY
In conjunction with the passage of the code, DoD issued
a guidance document in the form of a revised Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). "Use of
Warranties in Weapon System Procurements" specifically
addresses the warranty legislation and provides guidance and
direction in such areas as tailoring clauses, Government-
furnished property, foreign military sales, warranty cost-
benefit analysis, and waiver procedures (included as
Appendix D)
.
In contrast to the FAR, DFARS criteria for warranty use
is in direct consonance with the new legislation.
Specifically: [Ref. 4: p. 46.703]
The use of warranties in the procurement of weapons
systems is mandatory pursuant to 10 USC 2403, unless a
waiver is authorized. Policy and procedures for obtaining
such warranties or waivers are contained in [DFARS]
46.770. Acquisition of warranties in the procurement of
supplies that do not meet the definition of a weapon
system (e.g., spare, repair, or replacement parts) is
governed by FAR 46.7. However, should the Government
elect to obtain a warranty for such supplies, contracting
officers should negotiate warranties that meet or exceed
the requirements of [subpart] 46.770 where such warranties
are advantageous and in accordance with Departmental
policy.
DFARS further specified three areas in which a prime
contractor must provide the Government with a written
warranty. These include: [Ref. 4: p. 46.7702]
1. Design and manufacturing requirements specifically
delineated in the contract (or any modification to
that contract).
42
2. Free from all defects in material and workmanship at
the time of acceptance or delivery as specified in the
contract.
3. If manufactured in mature full-scale production,
conform to the essential performance requirements as
delineated in the contract (or any modification to
that contract )
.
Aside from the flowdown of requirements from the
statutory language, the DFARS emphasized the tailoring of
warranty terms and conditions appropriate to the specific
acquisition. This "latitude" is an extremely important
consideration in the subsequent discussion of formulation of
Navy policy. Warranties, as in the case of any risk
transfer mechanism, must be applied on a case-by-case basis
and accomplished through the negotiation process. Specific
policy states: [Ref. 4: p. 46.770-3]
. . . Contracting officers may exclude from the terms of
the warranty certain defects for specified supplies
(exclusions) and may limit the contractor's liability
under the terms of the warranty (limitations), as
appropriate, if necessary to derive a cost-effective
warranty in light of the technical risk, contractor
financial risk, or other program uncertainties. Contract-
ing officers are encouraged to structure broader and more
comprehensive warranties where such are advantageous and
in accordance with agency policy. Likewise, the contract-
ing officer may narrow the scope of a warranty where such
is appropriate (e.g., where it would be inequitable to
require a warranty of all essential performance require-
ments because a contractor had not designed the system).
Of additional note, for purposes of this research, is
the treatment of warranties on Government-furnished equip-
ment (GFE). The original legislation contained in the 1984
Defense Appropriations Act did not exempt the requirement
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for prime contractors to include GFE in the overall integra-
ted system warranty. Clearly, such a practice would shift
the financial risk to the contractor in such a proportion as
to make all but a select few warranty arrangements cost
prohibitive. DFARS states: [Ref. 4: p. 46.770-5]
A prime contractor shall not be required to provide the
warranties specified in [DFARS] on any property furnished
to that contractor by the United States except for (a)
defects in installation, (b) installation or modification
in such a manner that invalidates a warranty provided by
the manufacturer of the property, or (c) modifications
made to the property by the prime contractor.
F. NAVY WARRANTY POLICY
Within the Navy, specific efforts to address current
warranty issues have been sporadic and untimely given the
January 1985 implementation mandate of the current code. In
September 1985, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics) established the Navy Warranty
Ad Hoc Group from representatives of the Navy Systems
Commands. This group was assigned to accomplish the
following : [Ref. 25]
1. Establish essential performance requirements criteria;
2. Establish procedures for warranty field administra-
tion; and
3. Determine contractual requirements to be placed on
contractors (i.e., segregation of historical warranty
cost data )
.
In late November 1985, the first draft of the proposed
Secretary of Navy Instruction, "Navy Policy on Use of
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Warranties," was submitted to the major Navy field
activities for review. [Ref. 26] Initially, the treatment
of express warranty cost and the associated contractor risk
were the prime stumbling blocks in publishing written
policy. [Ref. 10: p. 44] As of 1 July 1986, the major
sub-parts of the requirements section of the instruction
were as follows [Ref. 10: p. 45]
1. Navy Warranty Cost-Benefit Analysis Policy Guide;
2. Definition of essential performance requirements;
3. Minimum marking requirements; and
4. Broad-sweeping administrative guidelines.
The final instruction has yet to be issued, thirty
months subsequent to the January 1985 implementation date of
the warranty legislation. To the extreme surprise of many
of the interviewees who worked on the draft instruction, the
proposed final release is a scant two-page document. The
scope of the action requirements is provided as necessary
background for subsequent discussion:
a. The Chief of Naval Operations will:
(1) establish procedures to ensure that warranties are
obtained for:
(a) weapons systems meeting the thresholds
specified here [criteria outlined in DFARS
46.770-2, Appendix C].
(b) all other supplies and services (i.e., non-
weapons systems) per . . . [FAR and DFARS].
(2) establish procedures to ensure maximum use of
warranted products before expiration of the
warranty periods.
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(3) establish a customer/user notification system
which provides for feedback information on failed
items under warranty, minimizing reporting
requirements of fleet activities and maintenance
personnel.
(4) develop procedures for immediate issuance of
credit to the end item user, when appropriate,
when requisitioned products under warranty are
found to be defective upon installation.
(5) develop a system for collecting actual warranty
use and claim data, and for performing an analysis
of the data on an annual basis with the first
analysis to be performed on 30 June following
implementation of this instruction, and annually
each June thereafter. Provide copies of annual
warranty data analyses to the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Shipbuilding & Logistics) (ASN(SSL)
within 60 days of the end of each annual analysis
period.
b. The Comptroller of the Navy will ensure that
procedures are available to collect funds under
warranties and that those funds are properly credited
to the appropriate accounts.
c. The Commandant of the Marine Corps will develop
policies and procedures for processing warranty
claims.
The proposed instruction does little to answer the
concerns that were raised by the Navy Warranty Ad Hoc Group.
For example, policy decisions regarding the scope,
limitations, and applicability of cost-benefit analysis to
the individual warranty efforts have yet to be made. Key
players in a consentaneous approach to implementation and
development must be decided upon to facilitate the
collection and use of meaningful warranty feedback.
Significant cost-benefit analysis mandates access to a
central database of this nature. Also the effect on the
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Navy's competition initiatives must be addressed to ensure
compliance with the "DoD Replenishment Parts Breakout
Program" Statute.
Additional Navy policy will be implemented through a
proposed change to the Navy Acquisition Regulations Supple-
ment (NARSUP). Warranty administration, per se, is address-
ed in the draft and specifies the minimum contract data that
must be collected: [Ref. 27: p. 42.302 (a)(90)(c)]
1. Item description;
2. Applicable contract number;
3. Contractor name and location;
4. Dollar value of item under warranty;
5. Scope of the warranty (i.e., what is warranted, what
is not) and identification of the warranty provisions
(clause numbers) in the contract;
6. Warranty item repair history, including nature of
repairs, cost and frequency; and
7. Government costs changeable to the contractor (e.g.,
repair, rework, modification, reprocurement and
transportation costs).
The collection effort necessary to support this require-
ment will be an enormous undertaking. It will entail the
integration of data from the program office; contract
administration activity; inventory control point; depot,
intermediate, and organic maintenance activities; and the
fleet user. The current legislation requires the guarantee
of essential performance requirements and conformance with
design and manufacturing requirements only when a system is
47
in mature, full-scale production. Full-scale production is
defined as the manufacture of all units of a weapon system
or other defense equipment after the manufacture of either
the first ten percent of the eventual total production or
the initial production quantity, whichever is less. The
materials and workmanship warranty, however, is still
required on all units, regardless of coverage by the
essential performance guarantee. The consequences of this
being that equipment will be in the fleet with differing
warranty coverage. This further complicates the data
collection effort and substantially increases the chances
for the compilation of erroneous data.
Additional policy to be promulgated in the NARSUP change
definitizes the marking requirements for warranted items.
As a minimum they must include: [Ref. 27: p. 46.706(b)(5)]
1. National Stock Number (NSN) or manufacture's part
number?
2. Serial number or other item identifier;
3. Contract number;
4. Some indication that a warranty applies;
5. Manufacturer or entity providing the warranty;
6. Date or [operational] time that the warranty expires;
and
7. An indication whether or not attempted on-site repair
by Navy personnel will void the warranty.
Of further note is the inclusion of the Air Force
Product Performance Agreement Center in the NARSUP change.
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Program managers and contracting officers are encouraged
to contact the [center] for assistance in
developing and analyzing potential warranty clauses
and cost-benefit analysis modes [researcher's
emphasis]. [Ref. 27: p. 46.90]
Further discussion of the Product Performance Agreement
Center and its role in the warranty process will be provided
in subsequent chapters.
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
As necessary backdrop for further warranty discussion,
this chapter presented a brief overview of use of the
warranty in the Defense Department. Prior to the current
legislation, warranties were in use in DoD, albeit sporadi-
cally applied. The warranty law, 10 USC 2403, levied the
requirement that all major weapon system acquisitions will
include a written guarantee which covers essential
performance requirements in addition to the traditional
materials and workmanship warranty. This has had a profound
impact on the acquisition and logistics processes in DoD
which are still being formalized. Proposed Navy policy
addresses the tasks ahead, necessary for compliance, but has
not addressed the key issues in development, implementation
and administration of the warranty as it applies to the
interaction of the hardware systems commands and the Navy
Field Contracting System.
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IV. WARRANTIES AND THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will focus on the warranty and its implica-
tion in the development of the acquisition strategy. While
a warranty becomes effective after equipment acceptance by
the Government, the process of developing the specific
warranty agreement must start early in the requirements
phase. [Ref. 28
, p. iii] This development process will be
discussed as background to an examination of the spares
issues. The issues involved in developing the specific
warranty form will be examined as well as the application of
cost-benefit analyses and the waiver process. Also, the
role of the Air Force Product Performance Agreement Center
(PPAC) and its potential impact in the warranty process will
be discussed. The chapter will conclude with a broad
overview of warranty administration and its implications for
the Navy Field Contracting System, specifically the Navy
Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) and the Navy Aviation
Supply Office (ASO).
B. OVERVIEW OF WARRANTY DEVELOPMENT
1 . Strategy Development
Navy acquisition planning must include all phases
and related activities from product inception to operational
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support. [Ref. 29: pp. 3-15] Problems incurred during the
life-cycle of a program are inversely proportional to the
amount of planning incurred early on. A well developed
acquisition strategy is a vehicle to introduce the necessary
flexibility into a program and ensure that selected goals of
performance, cost and risk allocation are met. [Ref. 24]
Every acquisition is unique in the sense that specific
objectives vary. While maximum performance for minimum cost
are usually the mainstays of general objectives, the
strategy to achieve these objectives must be tailored to fit
the need. Considerations for unique strategy development
include: [Ref. 29: p. 4-2]
a. Management Concepts
(1) Use of organizational assets
(2) Planning and control of critical program activi-
ties
(3) Establishing the baseline for the Integrated
Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) and the Test and
Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)
(4) Identification of known-unknowns and their likely
impact
(5) Scheduling
(6) Testing, demonstration and evaluation
b. Interdependence of effort with other programs
(1) Platforms on which the developing system is to be
used
(2) Other programs on which the program depends for
technology demonstrations, fallback options,
interface requirements, or components
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(3) Interservice or North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) interoperability requirements
c. Competition concerns
(1) Methods for obtaining and maintaining competition
(2) Into what phases should competition extend and at
what level (system, subsystem, component)?
(3) Will there be competitive procurement?
Reprocurement?
(4) How many and what kind of competitors?
(5) Cost-benefit analysis
(6) How and when to transfer laboratory contri-
butions/Government-owned information to com-
petitors
(7) Selection criteria for choosing best alternatives
(8) Funds available, timing
d. Contracting considerations
(1) Type of contract for each phase and rationale for
its selection
(2) Contracting plan
(3) Preparation of solicitation of proposals
(4) Makeup of source selection and proposal evalua-
tion teams
(5) Evaluation of proposals, criteria
(6) Use and handling of proprietary materials; how to
obtain Government rights to them; how essential
is Government control of the proprietary
material?
(7) Contracting initiatives, use of contract
incentives
(8) Monitoring contracts and contract controls
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e. Design-to-cost and life-cycle costs (LCC)
(1) Methods for projecting LCC
(2) Goals for design-to-cost, when, how rigid
(3) Manpower, resources, logistics, energy
(4) When to start and fund product improvement
programs
f. Budgeting considerations
(1) Realistic funding requirements (by phase) to
achieve objectives, including land-based test
support, test and evaluation, ILS
(2) Estimates of cost associated with cost growth
during research and development
(3) Effect of decreased budget allocations on
production rate, unit cost, program "stretch-
out", minimal and optimal amounts required yearly
for each phase.
These considerations are typical of the issues that
must be addressed in tailoring an acquisition strategy.
Specific plans associated with these issues support the
selected strategy and must be updated as changes occur
throughout the cycle.
2 . Risk Assignment
Inherent to all aspects of strategy formulation is
the concept of risk. The estimation of risk and its
effective management are essential elements to a successful
program. Risk management is defined as "the process of
identifying areas of risk that can effect the successful
development of a system, and taking corrective action to
reduce the risk to an acceptable level." [Ref. 29: p. 4-44]
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The methodologies involved are applicable to overall system
planning as well as to development of options that ensure
the objectives of technical development and performance are
met within the budgeted life-cycle costs. It is this latter
area of risk management to which the concept of warranty
development must be addressed.
A critical factor in strategy development is cost.
All decisions facing the project or program manager must be
weighed against budget constraints for any program to
realistically succeed. Warranty decisions are not excepted
from this requirement. Although some warranties obtained by
the Navy have not been explicitly priced, there is always a
cost to administer that should be factored into the life-
cycle costing model. [Ref. 10: p. 27] The cost of the
warranty must be weighed against the amount of risk trans-
ferred to the contractor for system performance. If con-
sideration is not given to this transfer, the effectiveness
of the warranty is threatened. Warranty price will increase
as the perceived risk increases. [Ref. 1: p. 5-4] If,
during the warranty period, the contractor is faced with
extraordinarily large losses, the viability of the program
may be threatened. This point is especially important when
dealing with small businesses as is typical in spare parts
procurements. Any conscientious approach to warranty
development must ensure an equitable transfer of risk.
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3 . Warranty Plan
As stated, it is important that a warranty plan be
developed early in the acquisition cycle. The final
warranty plan must be carefully integrated with all other
factors in the tailoring process to be effectively
implemented. The selected agreement can affect equipment
configuration and design as well as the planning needed to
maintain and support the warranted item. [Ref. 1: p. 5-4]
Since the project manager has the overall responsi-
bility for the execution of his program, he is the logical
focal point of the warranty development.
Program, engineering, logistics, budget, and contracting
personnel need to know the warranty application at hand
and the areas of risk where inconsistency between the
warranty and program requirement could void the warranty
requirements. For example, Government decisions during
the functional configuration audit process could affect
either warranty performance requirements in the opera-
tional field environment or the contractors' liability for
engineering redesign as a remedy in ensuring essential
performance. [Ref. 1: p. 5-4]
The warranty plan cannot be developed in a vacuous
environment. A workable interface between the program
office, equipment user, and warranty administrator must
exist. [Ref. 1: p. 5-4] As such, the warranty plan must
address the following specific issues: [Ref. 1: p. 5-4]
1. Warranted items, coverage, and duration;








5. Communication of warranty claims;
6. Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS) and




9. Warranty data reporting; and
10. Special training for warranty implementation.
The warranty plan is the program manager's vehicle
for addressing the above issues and for ensuring the correct
application of the developed warranty agreement. It is this
plan that also ensures that organizational responsibilities
are known and that appropriate management decisions are made
throughout the life-cycle of the fielded equipment. It
becomes evident that the warranty plan is also the necessary
vehicle to ensure that warranty decisions made during the
operational phase of the equipment relating to spare parts
procurements are in consonance with the developed system
warranty.
4 . System Specification
One of the primary elements in development of the
warranty is the system specification, which defines the set
of system requirements. This is usually developed early in
the acquisition but almost in every case prior to the
Demonstration/Validation (DEM/VAL) phase. [Ref. 1: p. 5-3]
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The requirements of the system specification are translated
to development, product, process and material specifications
that are expressed in terms of design or performance
specifications, or a combination of the two. This is an
important consideration in the development of the warranty.
Performance requirements allow for greater flexibility in
warranty development while design specifications allow for
the possibility of future dispute action if the Government-
furnished design does not meet specified essential perfor-
mance requirements as delineated in the warranty agreement.
[Ref. 1: p. 5-3]
System specifications are integral to quantifying
specific warranty goals and objectives. From a contractual
standpoint, a warranty clause cannot stipulate that "the
system have a high reliability when used under the condi-
tions for which it was intended." Identifying key essential
performance measurements is crucial to implementing the
warranty and must be conveyed to prospective bidders in the
Request for Proposals (RFP). [Ref. 24] This allows the
contractor to structure his proposal in such a way as to be
competitive and ascertain his risk in accepting the intended
warranty. It also allows him to cost the warranty prior to
negotiation so as to realize potential extra profits if the
requirements of the warranty are met and exceeded.
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Specific requirements that are delineated by the
Product Performance Agreement Center (PPAC) in the develop-
ment of the system specification include: [Ref. 1: p. 5-3]
• Requirements in the system specification and flowdown
specifications must be quantitative.
• For requirements to be directly used for warranty
coverage, they must clearly refer to the operational
environment or special test conditions.
• Methods for measuring conformance to requirements must
exist or be amenable to development.
• Only a small subset of specification requirements should
be selected for warranty coverage.
• Higher-level, mission-related requirements are generally
preferred to sublevel requirements for warranty specifi-
cation (e.g., speed instead of engine and air-flow
parameters, system Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)
instead of unit MTBFs).
The rationale to select only a small subset of
specification requirements for coverage must be based on
cost and the realities of warranty implementation. In terms
of a weapon system, it becomes a monumental task to include
every single specification in the warranty coverage. Such a
risk transfer would surely make a contractor balk at the
potential monetary repercussions. For the Government to
unilaterally assign such a risk would surely be cost
prohibitive. Also, to administer such coverage is seemingly
unmanageable given the level of attention that would have to
be given to operational test requirements. [Ref. 24]
The PPAC recommendation to include system parameters
vice subsystem or unit requirements is not as self-evident.
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While again, system coverage may seem easier to implement
and administer, the potential benefits of obtaining
specified coverage on select, identifiable components might
far outweigh the additional effort expended early in the
acquisition cycle. Indeed, the process of delineating
essential performance requirements must address the various
mission-related requirements designed into the system. For
example, performance parameters for an aircraft must go
beyond speed and thrust capabilities. The various com-
ponents must be gauged as a whole and included in a total
package warranty. Missile delivery systems must perform at
the speeds required of the engine, as must integral points
in the airframe sustain required thrust environments.
Essential performance characteristics that are not tailored
down to the component level impact heavily on warranty
implementation. Flaws in an aircraft speed attainment can
be attributed to more than just engine failure. To seek
liability in such a situation will probably entail lengthy
litigation and result in a Government-funded fix. On the
other hand, a failure in a specific engine parameter,
delineated in the contract, will increase the Government's
opportunity to place liability with the engine manufacturer
and gain the full benefits of the warranty agreement.
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C. STRUCTURING THE WARRANTY AGREEMENT
The structuring of the warranty agreement for a specific
acquisition begins with definitizing the aquisition strategy
and the resultant warranty plan. The following general
sequence of steps should be considered in developing the
applicable coverage: [Ref. 29: p. 5-65]
1. Perform studies to identify characteristics to
consider for warranty/guarantee and identify candidate
approaches
.
2. Develop criteria and models and collect applicable
data to perform evaluations.
3. In conjunction with technical, user, logistics, and
contractual personnel, develop candidate approaches
and assess the feasibility of candidate approaches,
including consideration of warranty implementation and
administration.
4. Develop preliminary clauses or draft provisions and
provide "trial balloons" to potential contractors.
5. Issue a Full-Scale Development (FSD) Request for
Proposal (RFP) with "expected" warranty/guarantee
provisions for the production contract.
6. Finalize warranty/guarantee terms and conditions for
the production RFP.
7. Develop a warranty/guarantee selection strategy and a
decision model.
8. Issue an RFP with warranty/guarantee option.
Utilizing the above approach allows the Government to
price specific warranty coverage prior to negotiation and
perform the necessary cost-benefit analysis. There are
inherent advantages and disadvantages in each of the MTBF,
RIW, and other available guarantee arrangements. Tailored
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coverage can effect the degree of contractor risk (and
resultant price), administration difficulty, enforceability
risk, contractor motivation, and the type of remedies
provided. [Ref. 29: p. 3-10]
An effective warranty agreement must address two basic
issues: [Ref. 29: p. 3-10]
• Obligational viewpoint - Develop a warranty that will
obligate the contractor if the product is not satisfac-
tory, i.e., an assurance warranty.
• Motivational viewpoint - Develop a warranty that will
motivate the contractor to provide a quality product,
i.e., an incentive warranty.
An assurance form of warranty is easier to administer
and implement. As previously discussed, a breach occurs
only when the number of failures exceeds a stated threshold.
There is no stated or implied incentive for the contractor
to exceed the specified parameters. On the other hand, an
incentive warranty requires additional contractor investment
to reduce the failure level to a minimum and, as such,
reduce his overall costs. From a Government stand-point,
incentive warranties are costly. There is greater
contractor risk at stake in designing and producing a system
that exceeds the stated minimum performance requirements.
In reality, very few agreements are purely assurance or
incentive-type warranties. Warranties that identify
essential performance requirements may not provide a direct
incentive to exceed those set parameters. However, there is
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also the requirement to warranty against defects in
materials and workmanship. This coverage can apply to all
defects, regardless of performance characteristics and
provides an inherent incentive in that the contractor's
liability is decreased for the elimination of all failures.
For example, an essential performance warranty might require
a population MTBF of 1000 hours for an aircraft engine.
Even though the calculated population MTBF might be 1200
hours, a defect in any one engine could require corrective
action under the provisions of the materials and workmanship
clause.
1 . Acquisition Factors
The following acquisition factors play an important
role in developing and structuring the warranty agreement
.
[Ref. 1: p. 4-1]
• Development history - Detailed data on the system should
be used to determine potential problem areas on which
the warranty might focus. Prediction and test data can
help define quantitative warranty requirements.
• Small versus large buy - The larger the buy, the greater
the potential risk to the contractor if warranty terms
and conditions are not met. Generally, the severity and
scope of the warranty terms may vary as the procurement
quantity increases. For a small buy of large, expensive
items, the warranty duration can be on an item-by-item
basis. For a larger unit buy, the warranty duration may
be on a population basis, such as a single end date for
all units [of a particular quantifiable lot],
• State of the art - The greater the technological
challenge, the more difficult it will be to structure a
fair warranty at an equitable price. Equipment that
does not "push" the state of the art or that severly
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pushes the state of the art is a candidate for an
assurance type of warranty.
• Competition - The degree of competition will normally
affect warranty price and the contractor's enthusiasm to
undertake or bid a warranty with some risk. Without
competition, it is generally better to impose warranty
requirements rather than have the sole-source contractor
bid. The warranty terms should not inhibit plans for
competing future production contracts. For example, use
of an RIW rather than organic maintenance may not be
advisable if future production contracts are to be
competed.
For purposes of this study, the consequences of
future competition is of particular concern. A pure RIW
agreement obviates the need for competitive breakout of the
system repair parts as all repairs are the liability of the
prime contractor. However, the military environment poses
some important considerations on this contractual agreement.
The mission of the Navy involves complete mobility and, as
such, some degree of organic maintenance. Some systems or
components lend very well to a "no-maintenance" concept and
can rely on adequate replacement spares to ensure a
necessary level of reliability. Others do not. No ship has
the capability to carry a spare radar system onboard and
therefore must carry spare components or parts. The
structured warranty agreement must address the level to
which such spares are provided. If the operational tempo
increases to a level that requires additional spares to
maintain the same level of reliability, who is to fund such
an increase? If the level is outside the requirements set
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out in the agreement, the additional liability must rest
with the Government. At this point, what obligation does
the Government have to procure spares from the system
warranty holder? This issue must be addressed during the
system acquisition process and will be explored in the
following chapter of this study.
2 . System Factors
As previously discussed, the system characteristics
play an important role in tailoring the warranty agreement.
The following factors should be evaluated in the process.
[Ref. 1: p. 4-1]
• Electronic versus mechanical - This characteristic can
be important for determining warranty duration and
predicting reliability. Many electronic systems have a
relatively constant failure rate, which makes warranty
duration a less important factor than for mechanical
systems subject to wear-out. For example, there are
several well publicized cases of cracks developing in
military aircraft structural members after several years
of operation. Because of the greater uniformity of
electronic devices, a large body of data has been
amassed that is useful for reliability predictions.
Thus, there will generally be more confidence in a
warranty analysis of electronic systems than in an
analysis of mechanical systems with only a limited
historical data base.
• Transportability - This characteristic refers to the
ability to ship failed units for warranty claim action.
The
degree of ruggedization and costs of shipping are also
factors to be considered in developing warranty terms
and conditions that require transporting units to
another facility.
Field testability - The ability to determine reliability
at an intermediate maintenance facility whether or not a
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unit is failed is important in establishing a main-
tenance concept under warranty. For example, if
equipment is not available to test units at a base ship,
then a large number of units that test OK may be sent to
the contractor for warranty action. This can be costly
if the contractor can charge for processing non-failed
units
.
• Warranty markings and seals - Units should be clearly
marked that they are under warranty, and brief instruc-
tions should be provided as to disposition. if a unit
cannot be so marked, or if it cannot be protected
against unauthorized maintenance (e.g., through seals),




In addition to acquisition and system factors, the
operational characteristics of the fielded system must be
considered. Specifically: [Ref. 1: p. 4-2]
• Installation cycle - The length of time from acceptance
of the unit to installation should be considered when
establishing the duration of the warranty. Either the
average installation period can be added to the length
of the warranty, or the warranty can be defined upon
installation.
• Operating cycle - This factor relates to system usage
being one-shot, such as a missile; intermittent, such as
an aircraft; or continuous, such as a warning radar.
The type of usage can affect the type of reliability
performance parameter that is to be controlled, as well
as the feasibility and method of measuring success or
failure of the item in field use. For one-shot usage,
success probability is the most applicable reliability
parameter; for intermittent usage, mission reliability
or MTBF is generally used; and for a continuously
operating system, operational availability is usually
appropriate.
• Existing military maintenance capability - If a military
maintenance capability already exists, a warranty that
requires establishing a contractor repair facility may
not be cost effective. This does not rule out alterna-
tive forms of remedy that do not require contractor
repair facilities.
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• Performance measurement - The ability to measure
performance parameters is critical when establishing the
essential performance requirements. Elapsed time
indicators on units may be used to record operational
usage, and maintenance records maybe used to record
failures. However, in many cases special data
collection methods may have to be implemented or special
operational tests conducted.
• Pipeline factors - The transportability of the units,
the length of the pipeline, the sparing level, and the
cost of spares all influence the maintenance concept
under warranty. Government repair using bill-back
procedures should be used when contractor repair is too
costly because of pipeline factors.
• Self-sufficiency - In cases where the criticality of the
system dictates military maintenance, warranty remedies
using bill-back procedures are recommended.
• Transition - The need to transition out of warranty can
influence the warranty structure. Thought has to be
given to a one-time versus a phased transition,
especially if the contractor is performing depot
maintenance.
D. WARRANTY TERMS AND CONDITIONS - CLAUSE DEVELOPMENT
The clauses that comprise the warranty agreement must
explicitly detail both the contractor's and
Government's obligations toward warranty implementation.
[Ref. 1: p. 4-5] While a number of standard clauses exist
within DoD usage, the end-product must fit the acquisition,
system and operational characteristics of the warranted
item. Basic considerations include item identification,
coverage, remedy, and duration.
Regardless of coverage selection, an initial concern in
developing the agreement is to ensure that Government
inspection and acceptance does not void or dilute the
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warranty. [Ref. 1: p. 4-5] A typical statement is as
follows: [Ref. 1: p. 4-5]
Notwithstanding Government inspection and acception of
supplies and services furnished under this contract or any
provisions of this contract concerning the conclusiveness
thereof, the contractor warrants that items [delineate




The terms and conditions should clearly delineate
the items to be included in the coverage. This is generally
done by contract line item reference. A provision can also
be included to cover items installed in the repair process.
For example: [Ref. 1: p. 4-5]
This warranty covers line items 001AA through 001AF and
each component thereof, including items subsequently
installed by either the Government or the contractor to
correct a defect.
Inclusion of this type of provision will allow the
Government a great deal of leeway in developing subsequent
spares warranties. However, the contractor must accept such
a provision and may do so only at a significant price.
Additional considerations must include system
definition and further definition of the related components,
modules and parts that comprise the system. This is
important in delineating specific coverage and defending
possible future litigations regarding contractor liability.
2 Design and Manufacturing Control
In conformance with the statute, a clause must be
included to warrant weapon systems against defects in design
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and manufacturing. A standard clause is as follows: [Ref.
1: p. 4-5]
The contractor warrants that [line items] will conform to
all design and manufacturing requirements specifically
delineated in this contract [applicable sections] and in
any amendments thereto.
An additional clause would be inserted to limit the
contractor's liability with regard to Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) as specified in the statue and DFARS
requirement.
3 . Defects in Materials and Workmanship Control
An additional clause is required to cover defects in
materials and workmanship as per the statute. A generic
clause is as follows: [Ref. 1: p. 4-6]
The contractor warrants that line items provided under
this contract are free from all defects in materials and
workmanship at the time of acceptance (or delivery)
[applicable specifications or contract provisions may be
referenced ] .
The inclusion of the phrase "at time of acceptance
or delivery" controls latent defects. It also leaves open
to dispute that any defects discovered during the warranty
period were present during acceptance or at time of
delivery. To mitigate this liability, the contracting
officer may omit the phrase and extend the coverage for the
warranty period. However, this involves a further shift of
risk to the contractor and, as such, additional costs.
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4
. Essential Performance Requirements
The inclusion of this provision in the warranty
agreement directly implements the requirements and legisla-
tive intent of the statue. As previously discussed, the
contracting officer has a variety of options that should be
judiciously considered in consonance with the acquisition
strategy. Generally, selected requirements should be
included rather than a broad system requirement which might
state that the contractor guarantees that all performance
requirements in this contract will be satisfied. The
delineated requirements statement specifies line items
within the contract and assigns individual essential
performance requirements to each sub-system or major
component. Reliability is used to gauge satisfactory system
performance and can include "catastrophic failure (e.g.,
short circuit of an electronic module) as well as design or
performance failure (e.g., inability of a radar to locate or
track a target)." [Ref. 1: p. 4-7]
Specific examples of clauses that may be used
integrating a reliability-related parameter are as follows:
[Ref. 1: p. 4-7]
a. Mean Time Between Corrective Maintenance Actions-
Individual System. This provides a control on MTBF
for each delivered unit and is applicable for small
buys of very large units:
The contractor guarantees that each XYZ system will
maintain a mean time between corrective maintenance
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actions of hours for the period specified in
paragraph .
b. MTBF Control of Population. For smaller units, it is
usually better to place the reliability control on the
population of units:
The contractor guarantees that the MTBF for the
population of all delivered systems will be
hours when measured in accordance with the procedures
delineated in paragraph
.
c. Engine Performance Parameters. Engine Warranties
provide good examples of essential performance
requirements not specifically related to reliability.
For example:
The contractor warrants that the performance of each
engine delivered, for the period specified shall not
be less than 95 percent of the intermediate thrust as
set forth in specification ABC and shall not exceed
104 percent of the intermediate fuel consumption as
set forth in specification DEF.
d. Failure Threshold. For an assurance form of warranty
in which the contractor is liable only for failures
that exceed a threshold, a typical clause is as
follows
:
A threshold number of valid warranty failures of
depot-repairable parts is established during the
specified warranty period. The contractor shall be
liable for the repair/replacement costs of all valid
warranted failures that exceed this threshold number
during the warranty period.
5 . Warranty Duration
The duration period of the warranty coverage is a
major element in the agreement. "Warranty cost, incentives,
administrative factors, investment decisions, risk, and
other factors are all keyed to the duration."
[Ref. 1: p. 4-8] In consideration of these factors, there
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are many alternatives available, including the following:
[Ref. 1: p. 4-8]
• Duration applies to individual items versus lots.
• Duration starts with delivery (or acceptance) versus
installation versus some other event.
• Duration is in terms of calendar time, operating time,
or a combination [e.g., 5 years or 50,000 miles, which
ever comes first].
• Warranty period can terminate early or be extended,
depending on the item's performance.
6
. Conformance Determination
The warranty agreement should be explicitly clear
how conformance to the requirements is to be verified.
Without such a determination procedure, the Government
assumes that all failed units within the specified period
are subject to the contractor's liability. If the
contractor does not agree, then it becomes a matter of
dispute that may involve litigation. To minimize this risk,
the contract can state "a presumption of failure" and place
the burden of proof on the contractor, or specify a failure-
verification procedure. Example clauses as follows:
[Ref. 1: p. 4-9]
a. Presumption of Failure. It is presumed that all items
sent back for a defect in materials and workmanship or
in design and manufacturer are covered by this
warranty, unless the contractor can present clear and
convincing evidence to the Government otherwise.
b. Specified Verification Test Procedure. Units returned
for warranty correction are presumed to be defective,
unless the contractor can show otherwise, using the
applicable test procedures specified in document XYZ.
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Obviously, the more complex nature of the system, or
of the coverage, will require more complex performance
tests. A general statement used to indicate a special test
to verify conformance is a follows:
During the period specified in paragraph
,
the
Government will conduct an operational countdown test in
accordance with the procedures specified in document XYZ
in order to verify conformance to the stipulated essential
performance requirements. The contractor may witness such
tests at no additional costs to the Government. . . .
[Ref. 1: p. 4-9]
7 . Exclusions
Exclusionary clauses are necessary to the agreement
to limit the contractor's risk for defects that are beyond
his control. Such clauses must be carefully worded to
ensure they are invoked only for the purpose for which they
were intended. A general clause is as follows:
[Ref. 1: p. 4-11]
The contractor shall not be liable under the terms of this
warranty for any failures that occur as a result of
[examples include:]
• Accidents




• Government misuse, mishandling, repair, or installa-
tion not in accordance with prescribed procedures
• Nonapproved storage, crating, or packaging
• Sabotage, vandalism.
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8 . Contractor Obligations
The clauses that fall under the category of
contractor obligations are necessary to implement the
warranty and further define the contractor's risk. Of
paramount importance is the specified remedy to correct a
warranted defect. Again, the nature of the acquisition and
the system define the appropriate remedy. As specified in
the DFARS , the following are the three basic options:
[Ref. 4: p. 46.770-2]
• Contractor implements a corrective action.
• Contractor pays costs reasonably incurred by the
[Government] in taking necessary corrective action.
• There is an equitable reduction in contract price.
Actual clauses may make use of one or more of the
specified remedies, depending on the circumstances.
Additional clauses defining the contractor's
obligations in implementing the warranty are as follows:
[Ref. 1: p. 4-13]
• Transportation. Usually the contractor pays for all
transportation involved in shipping and returning the
warranted item. However, consideration may be made to
the contractor's risk involved for widespread deployment
of the item.
• Warranty Data and Reports. This includes such coverage
as configuration control and the furnishing of the
necessary data for warranty analysis. Such data would
be necessary to meet the Navy's requirement for warranty
feedback information. [Ref. 26]
• Warranty marking. An important clause to warranty
administration. Elements would include the DFARS
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requirements governed by MIL-STD-130 and MIL-STD-129 and
also the specific Navy marking requirements. [Ref. 26]
• Warranty Seals. If the warranty is voidable through
Government repair, a clause requiring equipment seals
should be considered. The contractor can be made
liable to prove that seal breakage was not inadvertent
to further reduce the possibility of disputes.
[Ref. 1: p. 4-13]
• Installation of Warranty Engineering Change Proposals
(ECP). The contractor can have the option to introduce
an ECP to reduce future failures. Such a clause would
require the contractor to install the approved ECP in
all warranted equipments. [Ref. 1: p. 4-13]
• Technical manuals. A clause should be used to ensure
that all appropriate warranty information is included in
the provided technical manuals. This also can be
instrumental in administering the warranty.
9 . Government Obligations
To further define the warranty-related risk, the
contract should specify those obligations the Government
must fulfill to implement the warranty. Such definition
reduces the possibility of future disputes. Those areas
include
:
• Warranty Administration. Implementation of the warranty
requires the Government (specifically, the agency) to
establish an administration plan, delineating procedures
and responsibilities. On a macro scale, the Government
should protect its rights provided in the warranty
agreement. For example, the Government should include a
clause in the contract allowing for cancellation of the
warranty with a negotiated equitable adjustment.
[Ref. 1: p. 4-14]
• Testing and Verification. A clause should be included
stipulating the Government's right of testing and
verification. This can include determination that an
item is failed, system performance criteria have not
been met, or stipulation that the verification of seal
breakage rests with the Government. [Ref. 1: p. 4-14]
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• Notification. A clause should be included stating the
Government's obligation to notify the contractor of a
warranty breach. Specified time limits for notification
will limit the contractor's liability for warranted
failures not reported within the duration period.
• Shipping. Most likely, the shipment of warranted items
will be accomplished at some point within the Government
transportation system. A clause should set out shipping
requirements in terms of packaging and marking.
• Data. Some warranty coverage will necessitate the
Government's compilation of data to determine
conformance. For example, this is particulary true of
the MTBF - population coverage. A clause should set out
the Government's obligation to provide such data to the
contractor to benefit the contractor in failure analysis
and repair. [Ref. 1: p. 4-15]
• Maintenance. In most cases, particulary in the case of
a war-deployed system, the Government will retain the
right of system maintenance. To limit the contractor's
liability, a clause should be used to specify under what
circumstances maintenance will be performed and stating
that qualified personnel and up-to-date technical
manuals will be used.
• ECP approval. If a no-cost ECP is submitted by the
contractor to correct a warranted defect, the Government
should state its obligation to approve such an ECP in a
timely manner. [Ref. 1: p. 4-15]
E. ROLE OF THE PRODUCT PERFORMANCE AGREEMENT CENTER
The Air Force Product Performance Agreement Center was
established to assist the acquisition process in the se-
lection and use of specific warranty forms. [Ref. 30: p. i]
Specifically, the PPAC is charged with : [Ref. 30: p. 2-1]
• Serving as the central repository of Air Force Product
Performance Agreement (PPA) related data.
• Analyzing the effectiveness of existing and proposed
warranties, guarantees, award fees, incentives, related
contractual provisions, solicitation instructions, and
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other PPA associated contracting strategies and/or
management and administration systems.
• Developing improved contract clauses and related
concepts as well as methodologies for selecting
appropriate and cost effective PPAs.
• Providing technical assistance to Air Force activities
in selecting, tailoring, pricing, negotiating, and
administering appropriate agreements through:
- Direct consultation with program/system managers and
staff;
- Periodic publication of guides, handbooks, and/or
technical reports and;
- Periodic sponsorship of workshops, symposia,
briefings, and other communications designed to
improve Air Force wide use of PPAs.
• Formulating proposed policy guidance for Headquarters
USAF consideration concerning application of PPAs to Air
Force acquisitions.
The Air Force's lead in recognizing the benefits of such
an organization as PPAC has been acknowledged by the other
Services. The structure, use and implementation of
warranties was a complicated process even before the current
legislation. As discussed, successful implementation is
dependent upon the collection and dissemination of usage
data. It is inherent to the cost-benefit analysis process
and, on a practical basis, even more useful as far as
building a "lessons-learned" file. It would seem
impractical for DoD, as a whole, to duplicate the efforts of
the PPAC that have been underway since 1982.
During the time frame of this research, a Memorandum of
Agreement on a Joint Warranty Data Exchange for the Army,
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Navy, and Air Force has been signed. [Ref. 31] Its purpose
is to delineate the actions of each Service in establishing
a program to foster the exchange of warranty information
with minimal potential for duplication of effort. Within
available resources, each Service
will provide copies of warranty clauses, program
assessments, lessons learned, command level analysis
reports, regulations, policy documents, handbooks,
computer model descriptions, data collection and analysis
program descriptions, warranty plans, technical reports,
and studies to the other services as required. [Ref. 31]
On a practical basis, the Decision Support System
maintained by PPAC is the vehicle available to accomplish
this wholesale exchange of warranty information. The
Decision Support System (DSS) includes a library query
system of warranty data maintained in the PPAC hard-copy
library. Utilizing a locally-available personal computer
terminal, program offices can access the library via a modem
and conduct an on-line search for relevant information to
selected warranty types. Additionally, PPAC maintains an
on-line model for selecting, analyzing and structuring
specific warranty/guarantee forms.
This researcher has used the PPAC system and found it to
be very effective and easy to use. However, the current
volume of warranty-related studies and reports is dwarfed by




In determining if a warranty is cost effective, "the
analysis should examine a weapon system's life cycle costs,
both with and without a warranty. ..." [Ref. 4: p. 46.75]
As such, all acquisition, operation, and support elements
that are a part of life-cycle costs and that are affected by
warranty coverage should be reviewed. [Ref. 10: p. 91]
A current General Accounting Office (GAO) report reviews
the level of implementation of the warranty legislation
within each of the Services. [Ref. 32] In the report,
ninety-seven contracted warranties were reviewed and only
nine were found to have completed cost-benefit analyses.
No such analyses were prepared for the following:
[Ref. 32: p. 30]
1. 52 warranties with identifiable warranty prices
(including three warranties priced at $0) totaling
$180 million;
2. 16 warranties that were not separately priced; and
3. 20 warranties for which the warranty price had not yet
been definitized.
Various reasons were obtained for not performing
cost-effectiveness analyses, including the following:
[Ref. 32: p. 33]
1. The warranty price fell within what was considered an
acceptable percentage of the contract price;
2. No model or historical data were available to perform
the analyses;
3. The procurement was competitive; and
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4. The warranty was not separately priced or was con-
sidered a no-cost warranty.
DoD policy states that warranty costs are to be
specified either in the contract or in the contracting
officer's documentation supporting contract negotiations.
[Ref. 4: p. 47.770-8] The policy defines a cost-
effectiveness evaluation as relating warranty benefits to
warranty costs. It also identified the following cost
analysis factors for consideration in the evaluation:
[Ref. 32: p. 32]
• the contractor's fee for the deferred liability under
the warranty
• the Government's administration and enforcement costs
• the effect of competition on the warranty price
• the cost of correction or replacement without a warranty
by the contractor, Government, or another source
• Indirect Government costs, such as the effect on
logistics support capability, breakout, and competitive
procurement of system components.
In this research's view, the reasons given by the
Services for not performing cost-benefit analyses in those
cases identified in the GAO report do not seem to provide
adequate justification. Even though competitive
procurements provide reasonable assurance that fair and
reasonable prices are obtained, it is still possible that
the procurement could be more cost-effective without a
warranty. While cost-benefit analyses cannot be prepared
when warranties are not separately priced, this certainly
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argues for obtaining the warranty price so that an analysis
can be prepared. Also, although it appears on the surface
that no-cost warranties would inherently be cost-effective,
other costs and conditions must be considered, such as the
administrative burden and the effect on operations of having
to maintain control over warranted parts. Also, additional
quantities of parts may be required to compensate for return
and repair time, downtime, and storage time.
It is not the purpose of this research to identify and
evaluate the myriad of cost-benefit models that are
currently available within DoD and the literature that can
be applied to the warranty. All three Services have
developed and are developing new models for this purpose.
The Army has issued a cost-effectiveness analysis checklist
as part of its warranty regulations to ensure that such
analyses are performed. [Ref. 33] The Navy has a similar
effort underway and the Air Force PPAC Decision Support
System includes the Life Cycle Cost Breakdown Model.
The final decision to use a warranty requires full
consideration of cost-effectiveness. Many, if not all, of
the direct costs involved in a warranty can be easily
modeled and data may be available for obtaining parametric
estimates. However, some equally important cost factors are
not as amenable to modeling but could have a major impact on
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a system's life-cycle cost. These indirect costs would
include: [Ref. 34: p. 5]
• Competition - the cost of opportunities in the competi-
tive market place for acquisition of equipment and
parts
.
• Break-out - the cost of opportunities for break-out
acquisitions of sub-assemblies and spares.
• Warranty Bail Out - the cost to the Government in the
event the contractor fails to fulfill its warranty
obligations.
• Technology - the cost of opportunities in technological
advances.
• Second-Sourcing - the cost of opportunities in second-
sourcing of production units.
• Readiness - the cost of loss of readiness and failed
maintenance capabilities in a combat environment.
It is self-evident that the nature of these costs do not
lend to easy estimation. Nonetheless, these costs are real
in every sense of the word and clearly play an important
role in the warranty decision process. As such, use of the
available cost-benefit models can only supplement the
decision process as is the case in all decision support
systems.
G. THE WAIVER PROCESS
Consequent to the cost-benefit analysis process is the
waiver decision. The current legislation allows for a
waiver of part or all of the coverage requirements of the
statute if it is determined (1) that the waiver is necessary
in the interest of national defense, or (2) that a guarantee
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under the legislation would not be cost-effective.
[Ref. 4: p. 46.770-9]
Aside from two class waivers issued by the Secretary of
Defense in the interest of national defense, only two
individual waivers for a specific contract have been
approved. [Ref. 32: p. 18] In May 1984, the Army waived the
warranty in a contract for gyroscope magnetic compass sets
used in helicopter navigation. According to the waiver,
the inclusion of the warranty required under the statute
would have required the Army to recompete the contract
and delay the procurement of urgently needed equipment.
[Ref. 32: p. 19] The second waiver occurred in 1986 when
the Air Force waived the warranty in the acquisition of
Rapier Missile Fire Units. [Ref. 32: p. 19] The missiles
were being purchased from the United Kingdom under a
memorandum of understanding that did not require a warranty.
Neither waiver was the result of the contracted warranty not
being found cost-effective.
Five additional requests for waivers on specific
contracts have been submitted; two by the Army Missile
Command, two by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and
one by the Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division.
[Ref. 32: p. 19] None were approved. According to the GAO,
rather than approve waivers, the Services required
procurement officials to renegotiate warranty prices and/or
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terms to obtain a warranty acceptable to the submitting
activity.
In the Navy case, NAVSEA requested a waiver for a
contract on four Submarine Active Detection Sonar Transmit
Groups, which are major subsystems of the Submarine Advanced
Combat System. It was a cost-reimbursement contract, and
the waiver was sought on the basis that warranty provisions
were not cost-effective. The request was denied by the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and
Logistics). The contractor ultimately agreed that claim
costs would not be reimbursable, but the contractor's
liability was limited to three percent of the target cost.
A cost-benefit analysis was not made on the revised contract
because NAVSEA officials considered it to be a no-cost
warranty and inherently cost-effective. [Ref. 32: p. 21]
The Navy has since issued a policy directive setting
forth its position on waivers. The directive emphasizes the
need to separately identify performance requirements subject
to warranty provisions and states that the proper appli-
cation of specifications should eliminate the need for
waivers. [Ref. 32: p. 21]
Such a position on waivers enforces statute conformance
with little regard to the actual benefits derived from the
warranty. DoD, together with the defense industry, fought
very strongly against the legislation citing the requirement
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for an essential performance warranty as inherently cost-
ineffective. If this is the case, then DoD has a clear
obligation to prove this issue one way or the other. This
can only be done through the conscientious application of a
cost-benefit analysis and full support of the resultant
decision. If a warranty application accumulates conclusive
proof that it is too costly and/or ineffectual, than those
programs should exercise the waiver contingency. [Ref. 35]
H. WARRANTY ADMINISTRATION
Administering or implementing the warranty must also be
addressed early in the acquisition process. Issues
previously discussed, involving tailoring the acquisition
strategy and the resultant warranty plan, have a direct
effect on the subsequent implementation. Depending on the
complexity of the warranty being applied, the procedures and
interfaces needed for administering the warranty can vary
considerably. Where program technical risks are low and a
simple warranty is adequate, administration may be as
equally non-complex. On the other hand, program risks may
call for a more complex, incentive type of warranty that may
require extensive Government activities. In structuring the
warranty agreement, every effort should be made to keep the
administrative tasks to a minimum. The purpose of the
agreement should always be at the forefront: quality combat
weapon systems. The best way to ensure that the warranty
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will be workable is to insist that knowledgeable program and
logistic personnel participate in developing the warranty
contractual provisions and the implementation plan.
[Ref. 1: p. 6-1]
In general, the challenges that arise in administering
the warranty pertain to all procurements in DoD and specifi-
cally, the Navy. It is true that an incentive warranty for
a complex weapon system will require the compilation of
complex data (e.g., component data on MTBF measured against
specific performance requirements). However, the data
compiled for O-Ring failures under a materials and workman-
ship warranty require equal consideration for future
warranty evaluation. To be workable at the fleet level, a
conscientious system must be established to collect and
transmit the necessary information. Warranties must be
structured to enhance fleet readiness in the broad sense. A
clumsy, paperwork-ridden administrative system is not only
an indirect cost of the warranty but is an impediment to its
success [Ref. 24].
The purpose of a warranty administration plan allows for
acquisition, logistic, and user organizations to track and
administer those equipments covered by contractual
warranties, and to provide feedback to the contracting
community on the feasibility of specific warranty forms.
[Ref. 36: p. 1] The draft Air Force Warranty Administration
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Plan requires the identification of the following:
[Ref. 36: p. 1]
• Logistics policy, procedures, and data systems requiring
revision or development.
• Offices of primary responsibility and schedules for
accomplishing required changes or development.
• Limiting factors and constraints to the application of
warranties and their management.
As discussed, developing the warranty for a weapon
system and also for the acquisition of related components
and subassemblies, is a complex process that requires
planning. Implementing the warranty once the contract is
signed is equally as complex. To separate the two processes
becomes functionally impossible. If warranty remedies
remain unused, for whatever reason, the warranty becomes
inherently cost-ineffective. As such, a team approach to
the entire process becomes of paramount importance. This
team should include the program or item manager in addition
to the following functions: contracting; logistics; legal;
engineering; product and quality assurance; and cost
analysis, with support from other functional specialists or
organizations, such as PPAC and the competition advocate, as
may be required. [Ref. 36: p. 5]
The Navy's Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) and
Aviation Supply Office (ASO) will play important roles in
implementing Navy warranties. While formally under the Navy
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), each has strong ties to
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their hardware systems commands in the logistic support of
fielded weapon systems. Generally, SPCC and ASO manage the
bulk of spare components and repair parts for their counter-
parts, the Naval Sea System Command (NAVSEA) and the Naval
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) respectively. For example, the
return and repair of a failed warranted fuel control valve
from an aircraft engine will be coordinated through ASO
(irrespective of funding considerations). Likewise, a
replacement valve will be ordered through ASO by the fleet
user. While NAVAIR is involved in the contracting for
certain components, most fleet liaison is with ASO.
This relationship between NAVSUP (specifically, its
field activities) and the hardware systems commands compli-
cates the warranty administration issue. In previous years,
the workings of an established system would have come under
the umbrella of the Navy Material Command (NAVMAT) . NAVMAT
had primary responsibility for the logistic operations of
all the system commands. Unfortunately, NAVMAT has been
disestablished and the task of developing a Navy-wide system
approach to the warranty administration issue has yet to be
undertaken. As previously discussed, the responsibility
will rest with the Office of Chief of Naval Operations
(specifically OP-04) to implement an administrative plan.
[Ref. 26] Ultimately, the final drafter will, in all
likelihood, be NAVSUP.
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Warranted items will require considerable effort in item
identification, marking, tracking failed items through the
supply system, data collection, data analysis, and central
database development. Although the main body of procure-
ments at SPCC and ASO do not meet the specific requirements
for warranties under the statute, the majority of the
tracking efforts for all warranties will pass to these
organizations. The mechanisms and resources to implement
and enforce the warranty must be in place. A dialogue must
be established between the hardware systems commands and
NAVSUP to make it happen.
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter summarizes specific issues relating to the
development of the warranty. Development is not a separable
function from the other important aspects in developing the
acquisition strategy. It cannot take place in a vacuous
environment and must consider the established policies and
procedures for implementation. The benefits of applying the
warranty to specific weapon system components were also
discussed. Structuring the warranty agreement was examined
in detail. The functional clauses that make up the warranty
form were discussed as well as their potential impact on
specific issues relating to spares procurements. The Air
Force PPAC has the potential to play an important role in
the warranty process. The DoD-wide use of the PPAC Decision
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Support System can greatly enhance the effective
implementation of the legislative requirement. Also
discussed was the importance of a conscientious approach to
cost-benefit analysis and the potentially consequent waiver
process. The chapter concluded with a discussion of
warranty administration, its purpose and its potential
impact on the Navy's Ships Parts Control Center and Aviation
Supply Office.
Chapter V will specifically address the spare parts
warranty and discuss the consequent administration issues.
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V. SPARE PARTS WARRANTIES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will focus on the application of the
warranty to spare parts procurements. It will first
definitize the Navy's concept of spare parts then highlight
the major similarities and differences between the spares
warranty and the major weapon system warranty. Included in
this discussion will be unique administrative issues that
affect each type of warranty. Also, the competition issues
surrounding spare parts procurements will be explored. The
chapter will conclude with a discussion of some of the
warranty initiatives currently underway that pertain to the
spares
.
B. SPARE PARTS DEFINED
There has been little study done on applying the
warranty to spare parts procurements. The DFARS policy
specifically exempts "spare, repair, or replenishment parts"
from the statutory requirement for a mandatory written
warranty. [Ref. 4: p. 46.703]
Relevant to the issue is the definition of spare or
repair parts. "Weapon System" has been defined in the DFARS
as any "system or major subsystem used directly by the Armed
Forces to carry out combat missions." It further provides
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examples such as vessels, bombers and fire control systems
and specifies that the term "weapon system" does not include
any commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the
general public. However, there is no clear cut definition
of a "major subsystem". One might infer that a major
subsystem is a system that can be placed within or onboard
another system. For example, a fire control system can be
placed onboard a ship or incorporated into an avionics
suite. Without further guidance, it is difficult to ensure
the intent of the regulation is faithfully carried out.
The Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) has provided
specific definitions to be used for material identification
and procurement. [Ref. 37: p. 14001] A repair part is
defined as
. . . an integral manufactured and replaceable part (or
assembly) of a piece of machinery or equipment, the part
being furnished normally for replacing a part worn or
damaged in service.
The NAVSUP publication further defines the terms "part",
"assembly", "subassembly", "unit", "group", "set",
"accessory", "attachment", and "system". Without belaboring
the semantics of the different definitions, it is apparent
that the distinctions between the different items are not
always clear. An assembly in one instance may be also a
subassembly in another application. For purposes of this
study, spare and repair parts will comprise the majority of
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items purchased by the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) and
Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC).
C. SPARE PARTS WARRANTIES VERSUS WEAPON SYSTEM WARRANTIES
1 . Similarities
A warranty has been defined as a promise or
affirmation given by a seller to a purchaser regarding the
nature, usefulness, or condition of the supplies or
performance of services to be furnished. The principal
purposes of the warranty are to delineate the rights and
obligations of the contractor and the Government for
defective items and services and to foster quality of
performance
.
This widely accepted definition makes no distinction
regarding weapon systems or spare parts. In fact, to make
such a distinction is contrary to the intent of the
statutory requirement. It makes little sense to pursue
quality in DoD weapon systems while repairing those systems
with inferior spares. Whether or not wholesale application
of weapon system warranties to spares is the best method of
achieving this quality requires exploration.
Developing a warranty for spare parts requires much
of the same analysis necessary for developing a warranty for
a major system. Both types exhibit the same cost-
effectiveness criteria, are tailored for the individual
procurement, and clearly set out the rights and
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responsibilities of both contractual parties in the warranty
provisions
.
Specifically, most spares warranty developments
require a warranty plan for each procurement documenting the
responsibilities, decisions, taskings and strategies for the
warranty. In most cases, this plan may be developed during
the initial spares buy and updated as necessary during the
life-cycle of the equipment as circumstances change. For
example, the plan could be updated when the duration of the
system warranty ends or it is determined that claim
processing costs are exceeding claim recovery costs for a
particular spare. Planning areas that should be documented
include: [Ref. 1: p. 2-8]
• Brief statement of the need and summary of the technical
and warranty history
• Responsible action point, contracting officer, warranty
manager, and other points of contact deemed necessary
for warranty administration
• Organization responsibility for warranty management
• Duration, marking, measurement basis, reporting,
disposition, material accountability, and other
information pertaining to the administration of the
warranty
• Cost-benefit analyses documentation
• Type of warranty coverage
• Procedures for tracking and accumulating warranty costs.
The type of coverage selected for the system spares
will dictate the complexity of the formalized warranty plan.
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The method for structuring the specific warranty form is
very similar to the method employed for structuring the
weapon system warranty. The same generic factors outlined




Consideration of these factors in structuring the spares
warranty will not necessarily result in the same coverage
dictated for the system warranty. Specific differences in
the factors as well as other important considerations may
obviate the need for any type of warranty coverage
whatsoever.
Structuring the form of the spares warranty also
parallels that of the system warranty. [Ref. 1: p. 4-4]
While it is in the Navy's best interest to utilize standard
"boilerplate" clauses to the greatest extent possible,
structuring the warranty must follow a well defined plan.
Standard clauses greatly benefit the acquisition process
through the timeliness and ease of applicability but may
inadvertently place the Government or the contractor in an
unanticipated risk situation. [Ref. 1: p. 4-4] Warranty
users must tailor clauses to fit the acquisition, equipment,
and operational conditions peculiar to the procurement.
This tailoring process as applied to spares procurements may
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be quite simple, however. The complexities of a weapon
system necessarily require a more complex decision process.
Some spares procurement are straightforward and only require
adequate consideration of the same clause forms to ensure
the contractual rights and responsibilities are clearly
defined. These forms include [Ref. 1: p. 4-5]:
• Precedence of the warranty over inspection and
acceptance. This statement is required of all warranty
applications.
• Equipment Identification.
• Defects in Materials and Workmanship Controls.
Applicable to all warranties to control latent defects.
• Other warranty Controls as applicable. If the warranty
plan requires Design and Manufacturing control and/or
Essential performance Requirements they must be clearly
delineated
.
• Warranty duration. The warranty plan must address
duration in consideration of the system warranty and
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• Testing and Verification
• Notification of Claims
• Government furnished warranty data
• Maintenance
• ECP approvals
Many of the above listed considerations are easily
adapted to standardized clauses for use in all spares
warranties. For example, in this researcher's opinion,
warranty administration procedures will eventually be
standardized. However, other clauses should fit the
individual procurement. Whether or not the warranted spare
will be subject to intermediate and/or organic maintenance
or utilize a "no-maintenance" concept, must be specifically
addressed in the contractual provisions [Ref. 1: p. 4-12].
The greatest degree of similarity between the weapon
system and spare parts warranty is in the area of
administration. While enforcement concerns may differ, the
administrative system should be identical to minimize the
burden of implementation at the fleet level. As previously
discussed, the Navy has yet to fully develop an
implementation plan that will facilitate the large scale
requirements of a spares warranty scenario. System
warranties are still few in number and can almost be managed
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on a case-by-case basis. However, once the fleet user faces
an inventory comprised of warranted spares, all of different
types and durations, a clearly defined workable system
applicable to all warranties becomes clearly necessary.
Such a plan should embrace the following considerations:
[Ref. 1: p. 6-5]
Pre-warranty-period activities (e.g., develop warranty
plans, develop training responsibilities (i.e., Type
Commander Readiness Support Groups))
Warranty-period events (e.g., organic maintenance plans,
second-sourcing plans)
Post-warranty-period activities (e.g., assessing
warranty cost-benefits)
Procedures for issue and receipt of warranty assets
Retest-okay processing procedures
Transportation procedures
Contracting data and reporting requirements
Packaging requirements
Transportation and packaging funding considerations
Damage reporting
Storage requirements (e.g., segregation from non-
warranted items in inventory similar to shelf-life
items
)
Commingling of warranted and nonwarranted assets at
stock points and in the fleet.
Considerations of stock-issue priorities
Communication procedures for maintenance and utilization
data
Description of DCAS responsibilities.
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Although resultant warranty decisions regarding
major weapon systems and spare parts may differ
considerably, the decision making process has many
similarities. When found cost-effective, warranties can
achieve the same benefits in the area of spare parts as
delineated for systems in Chapter II.
2 . Differences
The statutory requirement of a written warranty does
not apply to spare parts procurements. [Ref. 4: p. 46.703]
specifically, the DFARS states that "all subsystems
and components will be procured in such a manner so
as not to invalidate the weapon system warranty."
[Ref. 4: p. 46.770-3]
This is an obvious important consideration in
determining the applicability of a warranty to any spares
procurement. It makes the assumption that the system
warranty is cost-effective and that definitive guidance on
the spares warranty is communicated from the hardware system
command to the field contracting system. Without this
communication, field warranty efforts may be counter
productive and result in greater overall life-cycle costs.
The major differences in applying the warranty to
spares rests in the nature of the buys and the type of
equipment being procured. Major system acquisitions, as
discussed in Chapter IV, require complex planning, major
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staffing, and full consideration of both funding and
political pressures. It is a lengthy process in which the
warranty consideration is but one small aspect. Spare parts
procurements differ immensely. Buyers usually work under
the pressures of time and personnel shortages to meet
immediate fleet needs. While many procurements for stock
replenishment take economic order quantities into
consideration/ there are necessarily spot buys of small
numbers to meet operational requirements. As such, a
formalized approach to warranty development is seen as a
hinderance to acquisition streamlining in the Navy Field
Contracting System. Recent initiatives, such as the
Productive Unit Resourcing System (PURS), place a great
incentive on the supply system to streamline the process as
much as possible. Consistent preparation of lengthy
warranty plans for inexpensive spares may not be cost
effective for the buying command while still cost-effective
for the Navy as a whole.
As discussed, the term "spare parts" refers to a
broad classification of items. It includes spare aircraft
engines as well as O-rings and sheet metal screws. In some
cases, the inclusion of Essential Performance Requirements
is not only cost-ineffective but impossible as well. When
does an O-ring cease to perform like an O-ring? What type
of tests could be conducted that are of a non-destructive
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nature to ensure continued performance throughout the
duration of coverage?
Determining the type and level of warranty coverage
for the myriad of parts procured by the Navy Field
Contracting System is a complex undertaking. In addition to
consideration of the equipment and operational factors
discussed in Chapter IV, ample consideration must be given
to the original system warranty. Some spares have clearly
defined interfaces. Many avionic spares utilize "black box"
technology that allows for easy fault isolation. A spare
failure has little impact on the system as a whole. The
failed part is simply removed and replaced and can be
shipped off for warranted service.
This is a different scenario from some other types
of systems. A failed circuit card in a fire control radar
may wipe out an entire assembly. In this case, the failed
spare may invalidate the original equipment manufacturer
(OEM) warranty regardless of the warranty coverage of the
individual repair parts. Determining the degree of system
interface requires a level of technical expertise that may
not be available in the field contracting system.
Spare parts also lend to marking problems. While a
spare motor or engine can easily be marked in accordance
with the proposed NARSUP requirement, nuts and bolts can
not. Warranty information could be attached to packing but
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enforcement could become a problem at the fleet level. As
warranted parts become incorporated into the fleet
inventory, like spares will have different duration periods
and some older spares may not have a warranty at all. To
implement the warranty once the part has been placed in the
equipment will be almost impossible in most circumstances
when it is not marked. The user must know what is warranted
and how to effectively enforce the provisions.
Another consideration between the system warranty
and the spare parts warranty is the cost to administer. For
a system warranty to work, it must be explicitly priced.
While there are inherent problems in performing effective
cost-benefit analyses, it is clearer for the number of major
weapons being introduced to the fleet. The Navy Supply
System already has a repairable retrograde management system
in place. The majority of warranted systems will already
meet the system's criteria for turn-in. However, widespread
use of warranties for all repair parts will surely tax this
system and substantially increase the workload of the fleet
users. Shipboard squadron supply personnel will have to
track, package, and ship all failed parts that are covered
by a warranty. This may or may not be cost effective.
However, the systematic use of warranties for spare parts
will generate an administrative cost that will have to be
analyzed on a macro scale.
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D. COMPETITION ISSUES
The Defense Acquisition Regulation Supplement No. 6
requires the Services to conduct "breakout" reviews of all
replenishment spare parts with an annual buy value greater
than $10,000 which are also coded for sole source
procurement. [Ref. 38] "Breakout" refers to the detailed
data screening and identification process that leads to a
decision that an item can be procured from other than the
historical sole source. [Ref. 39: App. F] The stated
objective of the program is : [Ref. 38: p. 56-102]
. . . to reduce costs by "breakout" of parts for purchase
from other than prime weapon system contractors while
maintaining the integrity of the systems and equipment in
which the parts are to be used. The program is based on
the application of sound management and engineering
judgement in (i) determining the feasibility of acquiring
parts by competitive procedures or direct purchase and
(ii) overcoming or removing constraints to breakout
identified through the screening process (technical
review) ....
The program is comprised of two types or levels of
technical review: full screen breakout and limited screen
breakout. [Ref. 39: App. F]
A full screen review entails a 65-step process including
data collection, data evaluation, data completion,
technical evaluation, economic evaluation and supply
feedback, which is to be performed on items above the
$10,000 threshold with a forecasted buy within the next 12
months. The decision whether or not to breakout the item
is based upon the technical data available at the
Inventory Control Point (ICP) [The Navy Aviation Supply
Office and the Navy Ships Parts Control Center] and the
Engineering Support Activity responsible for the life
cycle management of the part and its parent system.
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[Limited Screen breakout refers to] limited screening of
one type or another that can be performed by any
procurement activity which also has a technical section
(e.g., the ICP's or Naval Supply Centers). The breakout
decision is made by the procuring activity based upon the
data available to the technician on site, or that data
which can be furnished in a timely manner by the customer.
For this reason, successful limited screen breakouts
usually involve material which is not highly technical in
nature and for which it is readily apparent that the sole
source contractor adds no value whatsoever.
The result of the screening processes is the assignment
of an Acquisition Method Code (AMC) and the subsequent
assignment of an Acquisition Method Suffix Code (AMSC) which
further describes the AMC by adding information concerning
the status of a part in areas such as engineering,
manufacturing and technical data. [Ref. 38: p. 56-102]
Over 80 percent of Navy managed items are coded for other
than competitive procurement. Breakout reviews represent
one opportunity to revise the AMC on existing
replenishment parts. Another is the AMC conferences,
where Navy and contractor engineers/logisticians review
spares manufacturing, quality control, and data
requirements to determine if competitive procurement is
possible. [Ref. 39: p. 13]
The Navy's Breakout Program has been very successful
since its inception in 1983. A four year phased program
seeks an annual full screen breakout review of approximately
23,000 line items as a steady state by fiscal year 1987. Of
the 17,265 reviews conducted during fiscal year 1986, 7,023
line items were broken out to either competition or the
actual manufacturer for a 41 percent success rate. The
Annual Buy Value was $41 million and $577 million for actual
manufacturer and competition respectively. The total cost
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avoidance attributed to the Navy breakout Program in fiscal
year 1986 has been $212.7 million. [Ref. 39]
The overall success of competition initiatives like the
Breakout Program has caused DoD concern with the warranty
requirement ever since the original amendment was
introduced. [Ref. 19] Of major concern is the possible
impact of the requirement for pedigreed parts. [Ref. 19] If
a major weapon system is under some type of warranty, this
would, in certain instances, preclude the option for
component breakout. Part failures that breach the warranty
agreement would be repaired or replaced under the
contractual remedy provided for in the contract. This would
appear to be a direct benefit of the warranty agreement and
provide DoD with measurable cost avoidance. [Ref. 13: p. 24]
Significant problems may occur when the Government has
voided the warranty on a particular component or part. For
example, a contractor-sealed unit may be opened by fleet
maintenance personnel to effect emergency repairs when a
spare is not readily available. In this situation the
Government would be forced to fund the replacement part. In
all probability, a breakout screen has not been accomplished
as the system is still under warranty and the Government
would be forced to go to the prime contractor for the spare.
An additional problem occurs in the case of dual
sourcing. Systems will be introduced into the fleet from
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two or more different prime contractors. In many cases,
each prime will be utilizing different subcontractors for
component parts. Can different spares be used without
voiding a system warranty?
Separate warranties can be obtained for all the spares
introduced into the inventory. However, this practice may
have no direct bearing on protecting the system warranty as
required by the DFARS . Warranty agreements can be obtained
that will protect the Government's rights to use different
spares in a specific system. This may be a feasible
solution in a leader-follower arrangement where there is a
great deal of communication between the two prime
contractors. Yet, in this researcher's opinion, this
contractually mandated right to utilize any spare component
or part in a warranted system may be very costly and not in
the Government's best interest.
E. PROPOSED NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND WARRANTY STRATEGY FOR
SELECTED COMPONENTS
The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) is currently
considering implementing an acquisition strategy that
encompasses the spares warranty concept. [Ref. 40] The




• equipment salvage value
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Currently being utilized for electrical equipment (AIR-536),
it involves the NAVAIR procurement of certain components
with specific warranty clauses. ASO would continue use of
these warranty provisions for all future spares
procurements. The basic concept centers around a new
category of secondary item which is classified as a
"rebuildable" rather than a "repairable". The Navy would
not attempt repair of these rebuildables but rather return
the failed units to the manufacturer for replacement or
rebate.
Under the strategy, the contractor would agree to
specific contractual clauses for first failure rebuildables,
subsequent failure and Navy induced failure. A detailed
warranty clause interpretation is as follows: [Ref. 40]
Under the provision of the warranty, the Navy would return
the warrantied rebuildables to the contractor whenever a
failure was noted. Each rebuildable would have a
contractor affixed nameplate which identifies a
rebuildable ' s serial number and its warranty expiration
date. Upon receipt of a returned rebuildable the
contractor would first determine whether it was/was not
inoperable. Operable units would be returned to the Navy.
(When an operable unit is returned to the Navy, the
contractor will bill the Navy for the test and inspect
cost.) Then, for inoperable units, under the observation
of a Defense Contract Administration Services
representative, the contractor would reach a determination
as to whether the failure was or was not Navy induced.
The inoperable rebuildable would be categorized as a first
failure or a subsequent failure. Based on these
determinations, the contractor would determine the extent
of warranty which existed based on the Navy's reported
failure date. Given the above determinations, the
contractor would be liable to provide specific actions as
discussed below.
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A. First Failure - Not Navy Induced . The "first failure"
category refers to the first reported failure of a
rebuildable which had been purchased at full cost or which
had been provided as a free replacement for a rebuildable
which met the first failure criteria. If it was
determined that the returned rebuildable was a first
failure and that the failure was not Navy induced, the
contractor would take the following actions:
1. If the failure occurred within the first 12 months
since the contractor had sold the rebuildable to the
Navy, the contractor would provide the Navy with a
free replacement rebuildable. It is understood that
the free replacement [spare] would carry a brand new
item warranty (as if it had just been purchased at
full procurement cost).
2. If the failure occurred between the 13th and 66th
month, the contractor would issue a 70 percent
discount coupon to the Navy and provide a check
which constitutes a wear rebate. The 70 percent
discount coupon can be used by the Navy for
procurement or rebuild of an identical unit any time
within the next five years. The wear rebate would
be based on the price which the Navy paid for that
particular rebuildable (when originally purchased)
times a sliding factor of l-[[# months elapsed since
warranty data - 12] divided by [66 months - 12]].
Thus the wear rebate would be approximately 98
percent of previously paid procurement cost for 13th
month returns and 2 percent for 66th month returns.
(For example, if the returned inoperable rebuildable
had been an outright purchase 13 months ago, the
contractor would provide a wear rebate of 98 percent
of the purchase price for that rebuildable.) While
the Navy would relinquish its ownership of the
failed unit when it was determined to be inoperable
by the contractor, the Navy has an option to request
the contractor to rebuild or replace the inoperable
rebuildable at any time during the ensuing 12 months
at a negotiated rebuild cost. The rebuild/replaced
rebuildable would be re-warrantied for 66 months
(under the "subsequent failure" category).
3. If the failure occurred between the 67th month and
10*5 years, the contractor would provide a 70 percent
discount coupon (as discussed above). While the
Navy would relinquish its ownership of the failed
unit when it was determined to be inoperable by the
contractor, the Navy has an option to request the
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contractor to rebuild or replace the inoperable
rebuildable at any time during the ensuing 12 months
at a negotiated rebuild cost. The rebuilt/replaced
rebuildable would be re-warrantied for 66 months
(under the "subsequent failure" category).
4. If the failure occurred at 10*5 years, the contractor
would not provide a 70 percent discount coupon.
While the Navy would relinquish its ownership of the
failed unit when it was determined to be inoperable
by the contractor, the Navy has an option to request
the contractor to rebuild or replace the inoperable
rebuildable at any time during the ensuing 12 months
at a negotiated rebuild cost. The rebuild/replaced
rebuildable would be re-warrantied for 66 months
(under the "subsequent failure" category).
B. Subsequent Failure - Not Navy Induced . If upon
receipt of a failed rebuildable it is determined that the
inoperable rebuildable * s failure was not Navy induced, and
it meets one of the following criteria, it is categorized
as a "Subsequent Failure". The criteria are (1) that the
unit had already been rebuilt or rebuilt/replaced for the
Navy or ( 2 ) that the inoperable unit had been purchased
with a 70 percent coupon.
1. If subsequent failure occurs within 66 months of the
contractor's shipment of last rebuild or
replacement, the contractor will provide the Navy
with either a free replacement or a wear rebate--
free replacement for rebuildables returned between
the 13th and 66th months since the last contractor
shipment. As discussed above in paragraph A2, the
wear rebate is based on the duration of time since
shipment of the last rebuild or replacement. The
rebate formula (as discussed above in paragraph A2
)
is applied to the previous applicable price actually
paid (less the 70 percent discount if a coupon had
been employed) for the rebuild/replacement. (For
example, if we assume a failure in the 13th month,
the wear rebate formula would call for a 98 percent
rebate of the price actually paid for that
rebuild/replacement. If the returned inoperable
rebuildable had been rebuilt or a rebuild/
replacement 66 months ago, the wear rebate would be
2 percent of the rebuild cost which the Navy
actually paid for that transaction. ) As discussed in
paragraphs A2, A3 and A4, while the Navy would
relinquish its ownership of the failed unit when it
was determined to be inoperable by the contractor,
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the Navy has an option to request the contractor to
rebuild or replace the inoperable rebuildable at any
time during the ensuing 12 months at a negotiated
rebuild cost. The rebuilt/replaced rebuildable
would be re-warrantied for 66 months (under the
"subsequent failure" category).
2. If the subsequent failure does not occur within 66
months of the contractor's shipment of previous
rebuild or replacement, the contractor will not
provide a wear rebate. While the Navy would
relinquish its ownership of the failed unit when it
was determined to be inoperable by the contractor,
the Navy has an option to request the contractor to
rebuild or replace the inoperable rebuildable at any
time during the ensuing 12 months at a negotiated
rebuild cost. The rebuilt/replaced rebuildable
would be re-warrantied for 66 months (under the
"subsequent failure" category)
C. Navy Induced Failure . If upon receipt, the contractor
and Defense Contract Administration Services
representative determine that the rebuildable' s
inoperability was Navy induced, no warranty applies. While
the Navy would relinquish its ownership of the failed unit
when it was determined to be inoperable by the contractor,
the Navy has an option to request the contractor to
rebuild or replace the inoperable rebuildable at any time
during the ensuing 12 months at a negotiated rebuild cost.
The rebuilt/replaced rebuildable would be re-warrantied
for 66 months (under the "subsequent failure" category).
To a number of interviewees, the implications of this
ambitious strategy are widespread. The major concern
involves the implementation of the warranty. One of the
clauses would provide for the issuance of discount coupons
to the Navy under certain conditions. NAVAIR would have to
identify a specific recipient for these coupons and
establish procedures for their control and use. If the
coupon is not used for a procurement or rebuild within the
five years after issue, the coupons are worthless.
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Another concern is the control of the "wear rebate"
checks issued by the contractor payable to the Treasurer of
the United States. Considering the duration of the proposed
warranty, it is a major problem to identify the
appropriation to which these rebates should be credited.
Depending on whether the acquisition was made by NAVAIR or
ASO, the financing appropriation could be either Aviation
Procurement, Navy or the Navy Stock Fund. The deposit of a
wear rebate to a specific appropriation could allow the
recycling of that account's obligational authority. A
recently released GAO report, titled "Defense Accounting
Adjustments for Stock Fund Obligations Are Illegal,"
emphasizes the need for DoD to clearly follow established
stock fund accounting procedures as outlined in 31 U.S.C.
1501. [Ref. 41]
Whenever the Navy returns an inoperable rebuildable to
the contractor, a determination could be made that the
failure was Navy induced. If such a determination is made,
the warranty clauses concerning 70 percent coupons and wear
relates are void. If the contractor determines that a
returned repairable is operable, the contractor returns the
rebuildable to the Navy with no interruption of that
particular rebuildable ' s warranty clock. Since the warranty
deals exclusively in dates, the Navy can hold a given
rebuildable in stock throughout the entire duration period.
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Also, it is questionable who is the final determination
authority for operability.
In addition to the specific warranty coverage, the no-
maintenance philosophy of the acquisition strategy has some
proven benefits. Studies performed by NAVAIR have shown a
marked increase in reliability for those components that do
not undergo any form of intermediate or organic maintenance.
[Ref. 40] However, it is the researcher's opinion that this
concept cannot be universally adopted without significant
changes to the Navy's logistic system. Many components lend
very well to this philosophy while fleet storage constraints
and forward-deployed maintenance strategies do not allow for
100 percent contractor maintenance.
F. NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COMMAND WARRANTY POLICY
Currently the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) has
no definitized warranty policy. Of primary concern is the
need to define NAVSUP 's role in the entire warranty process.
Lack of clear guidance from the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy's (ASN) office has left each of the systems commands to
pursue their own warranty initiatives with little thought to
implementation and enforcement. [Ref. 10: p. 57-58] NAVSUP
is not specifically tasked under the statute and the DFARS
requirements. In the classic sense, NAVSUP does not procure
weapon systems but rather spare assemblies, components, and
repair parts. As such, it has been NAVSUP policy that the
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hardware systems commands advise NAVSUP of its
responsibilities to meet the requirements of the system
warranties. [Ref. 42]
NAVSUP has established a Warranty Policy Committee to
oversee the development of a warranty policy instruction.
Formerly chaired by the spares competition and Logistics
Technology Program Office (PML550), it is now headed by the
Fleet Support, Corporate Plans, and Logistics Division (SUP-
03). The instruction is still being formalized with no
expected release date as of this writing. As of March 1987
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the following issues are addressed in the draft:
[Refs. 10, 43]
• Definition of NAVSUP, Hardware Systems Command (HSC),
ICP, and field level responsibilities in warranty
development and implementation.
• Establishment of a Warranty Manager at NAVSUP, ICP's and
Naval Supply Center's (NSC).
• Emphasis on coordination with HSCs in maintaining
warranty requirements on equipment supported by the
ICPs.
• Establishment of warranty acquisition and administrative
procedures by ICPs.
• Direction to the HSCs to issue policy guidance on
warranty data collection and reporting.
• Direction to the ICPs to perform data collection and
reporting in consonance with HSC objectives.
• Implementation procedures including administration,
warranty assessment and refunds and training.
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There has been much feedback from the directorates
within NAVSUP that will be impacted by the proposed warranty
policy. Many of the concerns deal with issues that have to
be addressed within the contract and may be outside the
scope of the instruction. For example:
• How will the user know the item is warranted?
• Is organizational or intermediate repair authorized?
• How are requirements determinations addressed?
Other concerns with the draft instruction are crucial to
structuring a workable administration system and should be
addressed. For example:
• The responsibilities for data collection are unclear.
Will each ICP design their own formats as per their
respective HSCs?
• The role of the Defense Contract Administration Services
(DCAS) offices needs to be further defined. While
warranty administration is within their purvue, DCAS
responsibilities need to be spelled out. [Ref. 23: p.
42:302(38)
]
• The requirements of the fleet user need to be further
defined. If the existing Quality Deficiency Report
(QDR) system is to be used, specific distribution
instructions will be needed.
The establishment of a centralized data base to track
warranty information is imperative in this researcher's
view. In addition to performing cost-effectiveness analyses
on future warranties, NAVSUP has a direct concern in the
tracking of its inventories. Just as the mismanagement of
Depot Level Repairables has a potential negative impact on
the Navy Stock Fund, so will the mismanagement of warranted
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items. The readiness of the fleet will depend upon the
myriad of warranted items being correctly shipped, tracked,
repaired or replaced, and put back in inventory. Failure to
do so can severely affect the supply system's inventory
models
.
G. OTHER SPARE PARTS WARRANTY INITIATIVES
1 . Aviation Supply Office
Aside from the NAVSUP warranty issues, the Navy
Aviation Supply Office (ASO) has been utilizing warranties
on spares procurements for some time. "Standard Supply 1
warranties as contained in the FAR are generally used for
all non-weapon system procurements except when found
not to be cost-effective on a case-by-case basis.
[Ref. 23: p. 52.246] Specific factors outlined for using
the warranty include: [Ref. 44: p. 1]
• Nature of the Item — Consideration should be given to
the complexity and function of the item, the degree of
development of the item, the difficulty in detecting
defects in the item prior to acceptance, and the
potential harm to the Government if the item were
defective.
• Cost -- The benefits to be derived from the warranty
must be related to the cost of the warranty to the
Government.
• Administration — As a general rule, there must be some
assurance that an adequate administrative reporting
system for defective items exists.
The ASO Purchasing Division instruction was issued
on 29 September 1982, prior to the current warranty
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legislation. However, in the researcher's opinion it is
still a valid and useful policy for spare parts warranties
that do not come under the current statutory requirements.
2. Navy Ships Parts Control Center
The Navy Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) has
little or no warranty experience or definitive policy. [Ref.
42] SPCC generally does not require warranties for spares
procurement because SPCC believes they are inherently cost-
ineffective. Warranties are rarely used for low-dollar
consumable spares or replenishment items.
3
.
Air Force Logistics Command
As previously discussed, the Air Force has extensive
experience in the development and use of warranties. The
Product Performance Agreement Center (PPAC) has been tasked
with collecting warranties and monitoring a range of quality
and performance incentives to improve reliability and
performance of subsystems, commodities, and parts. [Ref. 42]
The Air Force policy has long been to actively pursue
warranties within existing procedures if they are cost
effective.
Consistent with the policy that warranties should
utilize current procedures as much as possible, the Air
Force has issued the following warranty constraints:
[Ref. 36]
• The lowest level of hardware subject to warranty
requiring contractor corrective action should be that
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which can be effectively marked using MIL-STD-130
procedures.
• To the extent possible, warranty duration should be
stated as a fixed calendar date and be no longer than
that required to identify defects.
• Parameters selected for warranty coverage must be
measurable, and the method of measurement must be
included in the warranty clause.
• Failure analyses and associated reports should be
required for all items returned for correction to
provide engineering feedback.
• Generic clauses, tailored to meet specific requirements,
should be used to the extent possible, with each
procuring activity developing such clauses in
coordination with warranty administrative offices.
The Air Force has recently instituted a pilot study
at its San Antonio, Texas, Air Logistics Center (ALC)
regarding spare parts warranties. [Ref. 45] In an effort to
achieve the benefits of the warranty provision without
severely impacting the acquisition process, all spare parts
procurements contain "boilerplate" warranty provisions. The
warranty covers defects in materials and workmanship and is
substantially the same clause as contained in the FAR.
[Ref. 23: p. 52.246-17 and 52.246-18] The duration of the
coverage is for one year after acceptance by the Government
and does not vary. Additionally, the agreement provides for
the following remedies: [Ref. 45]
At the Government's option, supplies may be either (i)
returned to the contractor for correction or replacement,
or (ii) corrected by the contractor at the Government site
within CONUS [continental U.S.], or (iii) corrected by the
Government with an equitable adjustment of contract price.
. . . The contractor shall promptly comply with a written
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notice from the Contracting Officer to correct or replace
the defective item without additional charge to the
Government. Any disagreement concerning the contractor's
liability for the defect shall not delay the contractor's
correction of the defect. If it is later determined that
the defect is not subject to the warranty, the contractor
shall be equitably compensated. . . . Any items replaced
or repaired shall be subject to the same warranty as newly
delivered items.
While the warranty provisions are fairly standard
for the level of procurement, the Air Force has not paid any
additional direct funding for the agreement. The study
centers around whether or not there is any perceived
implicit price increase in the contracts that can be
attributed to the "take it or leave it" agreement. The
study began in November 1986 and of as 1 June 1987 there has
been no price increase that can be attributed to the
warranty. The study has yet to be released and whether or
not it will focus on any quality improvements in the spares
is not known.
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter summarizes some of the major issues that
pertain to developing and implementing the spare parts
warranty. Similarities and differences between the major
weapon warranty requirements that face the hardware systems
commands and the spares warranty issue facing the Navy Field
Contracting System were discussed. The chapter concluded
with an overview of some of the initiatives underway in
NAVSUP, ASO, SPCC and the Air Force to apply the spares
warranty in consonance with weapon system warranty efforts.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The objectives of this research were as follows: to
identify and discuss the background of current warranty
policy, to investigate efforts underway in the Navy to
implement the warranty requirement, to investigate current
warranty policy and procedures as they relate to the
acquisition of spare parts, to enumerate the major issues
concerning the relationship of spare parts warranties and
major system warranties, and to discuss the spare parts
warranty issue as it relates to the Navy Supply Systems
Command (NAVSUP) competition initiatives. In accomplishing
this, several conclusions were reached.
Conclusion #1 -- The use of express warranty provisions
in all Navy acquisition contracts can lead to tangible
benefits if properly developed and implemented . These
benefits include lower life cycle costs, improved tracking
and evaluation of field performance, the contractor's
assumption of risk for equipment reliability during the
warranty duration and improved equipment quality. However,
the realization of these benefits is directly dependent upon
a conscientious approach to warranty development and
subsequent implementation.
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Conclusion #2 — A properly developed warranty must be
tailored to the specific acquisition . The development of
the warranty is an integral part of the acquisition
strategy. As many systematic, operational, and acquisition
factors shape the acquisition strategy development, these
same factors influence the warranty. These factors include
budgetary considerations, Integrated Logistic Support
levels, interdependence on other programs, system
specifications and the adopted maintenance philosophy. Also
the developed warranty must be administrable.
Conclusion #3 — Warranty benefits cannot accrue unless
the warranty is properly implemented . Regardless of the
level of effort expended on warranty development, the
provisions of the warranty must be able to be carried out.
No warranty will be cost-effective unless it is properly
used. At the very least a system must be established to
identify warranted items, ship failed equipments, if
necessary, back to the contractor and return these units to
the Navy inventory. Failure to utilize the contractual
remedies of the warranty will be very costly and has the
potential to invite adverse Congressional scrutiny of the
Navy's compliance with the warranty statute.
Conclusion #4 — The Navy has no definitive policy on
developing and administering the warranty . Despite the fact
that the warranty statute is almost three years old, the
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Navy has yet to publish warranty guidelines on development
and implementation. While the Army and the Air Force have
comprehensive instructions or directives explicitly dealing
with warranties, the Navy has left each major buying command
to implement their own management policies. The impact on
warranty development is minimal. Each command has differing
requirements that directly affect the development of the
contractual provisions. However, the lack of a
consentaneous approach to warranty administration will
heavily burden the fleet user with differing requirements
that may become unmanageable and therefore unenforceable.
Conclusion #5 -- The Air Force Product Performance
Agreement Center (PPAC) has the available assets to greatly
assist the Navy in warranty management . The PPAC Decision
Support System is an excellent vehicle for developing the
warranty provisions specific to the applicable acquisition.
Currently the Navy has no comparable system and should take
advantage of the resource accorded through the recently
signed Memorandum of Agreement regarding its use. It may be
more cost-effective in the long run to provide support
funding to PPAC than to develop a similar system in each
Service.
Conclusion #6 — The wholesale duplication of warranty
efforts for major weapon systems cannot be applied to spare
parts procurements . The statute currently requires a
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written Essential Performance Warranty for weapon systems
and mandates the use of a waiver when it is not included in
the contract. There are no such requirements for the bulk
of spare parts procured by the Navy Field Contracting System
(NGCS). Additionally, the entire acquisition process and
environment is completely different. The Navy hardware
systems commands have the level of technical expertise
available to apply the warranty provisions to meet specific
objectives. They are obviously aware of the degree of
complexity of the system and have developed a comprehensive
acquisition strategy that integrates the warranty plan. The
NFCS primarily buys spares for system inventories and to
meet immediate operational requirements. Essential
Performance Warranties may not be cost effective for small,
repetitive buys and may be impossible to apply to most
repair parts.
Conclusion #7 — The system level warranty has a great
impact in the subsequent spares warranty development . The
provisions contained in the weapon system contract can
directly affect what type of warranty coverage is necessary
for the spares procurements. For example, if a provision
states that the use of spare parts from other than the
original manufacturer will void the system warranty, then
this must be communicated to the NFCS. Also, specific
remedies for the system components should be duplicated in
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the spares contracts to ensure the warranty implementation
is correctly carried out. Similar, if not identical,
implementing provisions will help to ensure warranty
enforcement in the fleet.
Conclusion #8 -- Development of warranty contractual
provisions is the same for weapon system and spares
warranties . Regardless of the level of warranty coverage,
the Government must ensure that its rights and
responsibilities are clearly delineated in the procurement
contract. As a minimum every warranty plan should address
the following:
Precedence of the warranty over inspection/acceptance
Equipment identification







Conclusion #9 — Current cost-benefit analysis models do
not adequately address the indirect costs of the warranty .
In addition to the explicit cost of warranty coverage, the
cost to administer should be considered. This is
particularly true for spare parts warranties where there is
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no statutory requirement to pursue them. In many cases, the
individual cost of the repair part can be greatly exceeded
by the Navy's cost to enforce the warranty. While tracking
and shipping procedures must be in place for the
implementation of all warranties, the added burden of
collecting data and contract administration for the bulk of
small, inexpensive repair parts procured by the NFCS can
become overwhelming to fleet user and warranty managers.
These costs are very difficult to measure but may be
considered on aggregate to set a threshold price level for
warranty pursuit for spare parts.
Conclusion #10 -- The long delay in Navy guidance on
data collection procedures will hamper warranty initiatives .
Data collection and dissemination is paramount to gauging
the effectiveness of warranties. While the General
Accounting Office has found the Navy to be complying with
the statutory warranty requirements, there is no conclusive
evidence the Navy as been reaping the benefit of the added
warranty costs. Before undertaking the additional task of
applying the warranty to all procurements, the Navy should
have a system in place to appraise the enforcement and cost-
effectiveness of its efforts.
Conclusion #11 -- NAVSUP Competitive initiatives,
particulary the Breakout program, should continue in
consonance with the warranty . The statute requires that all
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efforts must be made to protect the weapon system warranty.
Unless specific contract provisions state that use of
differing spares will void a system warranty, NAVSUP can
continue to breakout the applicable spares if it is deemed
cost effective. In those cases where the contractual remedy
will provide for contractor repair or replacement, the Navy
should adjust its inventory model accordingly to account for
the warranty duration period. As technical breakout
involves decisions made in consonance with the hardware
systems commands, especially in the case of the Navy Ships
Parts Control Center (SPCC) and the Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA), the level to which spares are broken out
and the ultimate impact on the system warranty can be fully
evaluated together to ensure the best quality for the least
cost.
Conclusion #12 — The NFCS field activities particularly
Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) and the Navy Aviation
Supply Office (ASO) , cannot drive warranty policy
initiatives . Decisions made at the hardware systems command
level ultimately drive warranty decisions made by the NFCS.
In compliance with the statute, SPCC and ASO must ensure
that the system warranty is not invalidated. Additionally,
major policy initiatives regarding warranty implementation
should apply to all Navy commands. It would
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be extremely difficult to administer and enforce the
warranty if there is no central coordination.
Conclusion #13 -- Warranties on spare parts should
remain as simplistic as possible until sufficient data are
available to determine cost-effectiveness . Given the
embryonic state of the Navy's warranty administration
policies, it is in the best interest of the Service to
establish a workable system to fully implement the
requirements of the statute and the DFARS. Once this is
accomplished, the Navy can phase in more advanced warranty
initiatives for spare parts. As discussed, these are many
administration factors that are particular to the spares
warranty. Establishing a basis for further expansion of the
administration system will probably be more cost-effective
in the long run.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are recommendations by the researcher as
of the result of this study.
Recommendation #1 -- The Navy Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP) should implement procedures that cover warranty
administration . NAVSUP 1 s mission regarding supply
transportation, logistic support, and management of the Navy
Stock Fund will require that the bulk of warranty
administration heavily involve the Navy Supply System. As
such, NAVSUP should take the initiative to implement policy
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that all NFCS buying commands must follow to assure
administration of any developed warranty agreement. NAVSUP
should take steps to ensure that they do not end up writing
policy to conform to the initiatives of the hardware systems
commands (HSC) but rather ensure that the initiatives of the
HSCs meet the NAVSUP administrative policies.
Recommendation #2 — NAVSUP should expand its warranty
policy committee to take advantage of field expertise and to
ensure rapid resolution of the warranty administration
issues . The Warranty Policy Committee should include
representatives of the HSCs, ASO and SPCC f as well as in-
house Technical, Legal, Stock Fund, and Contracting
directorates in addition to the current members. In view of
the three year old statutory requirement for warranties, a
workable administration system should be implemented as soon
as possible.
Recommendation #3 — The Navy hardware systems commands
(HSC) should drive warranty development initiatives for ASO
and S PCC . Spare parts warranties must take into
consideration the weapon systems warranties that they
support. This is particularly true in view of the statutory
requirement that spares warranties do not invalidate systems
warranties. As such, any special warranty requirements for
spares should emanate from the HSCs.
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Recommendation #4 -- NAVSUP should require the Navy
Field Contracting System to utilize a standard Materials and
Workmanship Warranty for all spares buys. The warranty
should be applied on a no-cost basis not superseded by a
higher requirement from the HSC . Use of the no-cost
provision has been very successful at the San Antonio Air
Logistics Center (SA-ALC) and after nine months has shown no
attributable cost increase in their spares buys. The
benefits of this type of coverage has been discussed and its
across-the-board use will bring the Navy more in line with
the other Services. NAVSUP should incorporate the
provisions of the SA-ALC warranty into the ASO warranty
instruction for policy implementation (ASO PGINST 4275. ID).
Recommendation #5 — The NAVSUP competition initiative
should continue in consonance with current warranty
initiatives . Insufficient data are available to ascertain
the full affect of the warranty on the breakout program.
However, under the guidance of the Competition Advocates and
warranty managers, a determination should be made during the
initial development phase of the acquisition strategy to
utilize each program as necessary to ensure the most cost-
effective procurements. Provisions can be put into the
system contract to ensure subsequent breakout if it is
deemed cost effective. In those instances when it is in the
Navy's best interest to protect the warranty for its
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duration, the Navy could assign an Acquisition Method Suffix
Code (AMSC) to reflect this (perhaps "W" ) . Spare parts
warranties, unlike weapon system warranties will have
minimum affect on the breakout program as long as an
effective communication system is established to alert
competition and breakout personnel of special warranty
requirements that obviate breakout.
Recommendation #6 — The Navy should implement a fleet
warranty training and enforcement program as soon as
possible . Consequent to any policy initiatives regarding
warranty development and implementation, is to ensure that
warranties are being applied at the user level. The most
conscientious approach to warranty development is ultimately
useless if fleet personnel discard warranted items during
the warranty period. Fleet-wide training is a lengthy
process and must include both maintenance and supply
personnel to be effective. NAVSUP should take the
initiative to begin this training and subsequent enforcement
as soon as possible to meet the requirements of warranted
equipment being placed in inventory. This can best be
accomplished through the appropriate Readiness Support
Groups and Type Commanders.
Recommendation #7 -- NAVSUP should establish warranty
managers at each of the NFCS commands as well as Ad Hoc
Warranty Review Groups to evaluate warranties and their
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ultimate enforcement . There is a decided difference int he
level of expertise regarding warranties throughout the NFCS.
Much of this expertise rests with ASO while SPCC has little
or no experience with wholesale use of the warranty. An
established warranty manager at each command would ensure
that policy initiatives are being uniformly carried out and
assist the training in warranty development and
implementation. The Ad Hoc Warranty Review Groups can
ensure the necessary warranty coverage is provided in the
contract as well as provide for the dissemination of useful
"lessons-learned: data and information to item managers.
C. ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question was as follows:
What are the principal problems regarding the application
of the warranty provisions to the acquisition of spare
parts and how might these problems be resolved ?
The problems involved in developing and implementing
spare parts warranties center around the nature of the
procurements and the difficulty in administering them.
Spare parts warranties are driven by the requirements of the
system warranty. As required by the statute, the Navy Field
Contracting System (NFCS) must ensure that the system
warranty is not voided. As such, the development of the
contractual provisions by the Hardware Systems Commands
(HSC) must account for subsequent procurements of spares.
Current policy does not require spares warranties and the
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NFCS has little experience with them (with the possible
exception of the Navy Aviation Supply Office (ASO)). It is
therefore problematic to begin to employ complex warranty
agreements for all spares buys.
Additionally, the Navy has yet to fully develop a
warranty administration system. It must first address
meeting the statutory requirements of warranty
implementation before it tackles the added complexities of
the spares issues. For example, the sheer bulk of the Navy
spares inventory, marking requirements and stowage and issue
considerations make spares warranties a difficult task.
Until such time as the NFCS becomes familiar with
warranty use and the administration system is sophisticated
enough to handle the enormous volume of spare parts, the
Navy should implement simple warranty requirements to
protect itself against latent defects. This would be a
standard Materials and Workmanship Warranty for a standard
calendar duration. The use of more complex requirements
should be dictated by the appropriate program office in the
Hardware System Command.
Once the administration system is in place, the Navy
should concentrate on fleet use in terms of training and
enforcement control by the appropriate Readiness Support
Groups and Type Commanders.
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The subsidiary research questions were as follows:
1
.
What are the current warranty requirements and
provisions for spare parts procurements ?
Current policy does not require warranties for
acquisitions of other than major systems. This would
include the level of most procurements made by the
NFCS . However, the benefits of the warranty can apply
to all Government procurements and each must be
evaluated in terms of cost-effectiveness. The same
structuring of provisions for major weapon systems
apply to spare parts. The developer must ensure the
Government's rights and obligations under any warranty
agreement are clearly stipulated in the contract.
2
.
What problems have been and could be encountered in
applying the use of warranties to spare parts
procurements ?
The Navy has little experience in applying the
warranty to spare parts. ASO is in the forefront in
including a Materials and Workmanship Warranty in the
majority of its contracts. While this has been found
to be a sound practice, little or no data have been
collected on the overall effectiveness of the
warranty. It is extremely doubtful that it has been
universally enforced and, as such, may not be cost-
effective in all cases. Without the benefit of a
centralized data collection system, it is impossible
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to evaluate the application of more complex warranty
forms to spares procurements.
Additional problems may be encountered unless
effective communication is maintained between the HSCs
and the NFCS. Special warranty requirements must be
known to the appropriate item managers.
The area of major concern rests with
implementation. Warranties must be used to be
effective. An administration system must be carefully
developed to encompass the vast numbers of spare parts
in inventory and also be simplistic enough to be
practically enforceable at the fleet level.
3 . Under what circumstances would the warranty
requirement be waived ?
Spare part warranties are exempt from the
statutory requirements and, as such, not subject to
the waiver process. Individual warranty teams at each
command within the NFCS should evaluate exceptions to
the standard provisions on a case-by-case basis when
it is deemed not to be cost-effective.
4 . What problems involved in the administration of
warranties must be recognized in the development and
use of warranty clauses ?
Regardless of the level of the procurement, every
contract should clearly address the following
provisions in the warranty plan:
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5.
Precedence of the Warranty over
Inspection/Acceptance
Equipment identification








The selection and use of each provision directly
affects subsequent implementation. For example, the
type or level of warranty control will affect the type
of usage data that must be collected. A MTBF
guarantee requires more complex enforcement than
materials and workmanship coverage. Additionally, the
remedy required may either make exclusive use of the
Navy transportation system or could entail detailed
bill-back procedures. It is extremely important that
the selected provisions can be effectively
implemented.
What implications does the Navy Breakout Program have
on the process of using warranties in spare parts
procurements ?
The Navy Breakout Program is most affected by
major weapon systems warranties. Spares or components
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that have been "broken out" and supplied as Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) may affect system programs
unless the system contract allows for it. However,
the use of separate warranties for those parts broken
out, can go hand-in-hand with the Breakout program.
When deemed cost effective, it is in the Navy's best
interest to apply separate warranties to GFE whenever
possible to ensure that the use of those spare parts
do not become the "weak link" in the system warranty.
Again, this emphasizes the necessity of the HSC
program offices to clearly delineate specific spares
warranty requirements.
What specific steps can be taken to address the
problems encountered by the NFCS in resolving warranty
issues and problems ?
Initially, the Navy must fully explore the problems
and define them as they relate to the acquisition and
logistics processes. Specific steps include:
• Expansion of the NAVSUP Warranty Policy Committee
to include such expertise as necessary to address
the issues and implement definitive policy and
guidance.
• Make better use of available resources on the
warranty (e.g., the Product Performance Agreement
Center and other Services).
• Establish a Navy-wide data collection system to
ensure support to the NFCS. Separate initiatives
by each of the HSCs will severely handicap the
NFCS and ultimately NAVSUP in any implementation
policy.
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• Establish warranty managers at each of the NFCS
commands as well as Ad Hoc Warranty Review Groups
to review evaluate warranties and their ultimate
enforcement
.
• Provide training to NFCS personnel on warranty
development and implementation.
• Establish training for warranty enforcement at the
fleet level to ensure NFCS efforts are being
implemented.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
The following areas are identified for potential
research
:
1. What type of cost-benefit analysis could be adapted
for use by the NFCS to evaluate the use of warranties
for spare parts procurement?
2. Could the Air Force Product Performance Agreement
Guide be adapted or expanded for use by the NFCS in
spare parts procurements?
3. What type of administrative plan could be adapted by
NAVSUP that will ultimately be enforceable at the
fleet level?
4. What type of training will be necessary for (a) the
NFCS, and (b) the fleet to implement the warranty
Navy-wide?
5. What type of warranty management structure will be
needed at NAVSUP and the NFCS to meet future
challenges?
6. Is it possible to automate warranty administration
utilizing existing hardware and software?
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
The following is a list of people who were either
interviewed or directly provided information necessary for
this research.
A. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics)
1. Morris, W. R., CAPT, SC, USN, Deputy Director
Contracts and Business Management, 17 March 1987.
2. Yaffee, M., Office of Contracts and Business
Management (CBM-CM), 27 March 1987.
B. Naval Supply Systems Command
1. Genovese, J., Director Spares Completion and Logistic
Technology Program Office (PML550), 26 March 1987.
2. Quigley, R. M., CDR, SC, USN, Spares Competition and
Logistic Technology Program Office, 26 March 1987.
3. Keller, F., CDR, SC, USN, Spares Competition and
Logistic Technology Program Office, 26 March 1987.
4. Fisher, A., Spares Competition and Logistic Technology
Program Office, 26 March 1987.
5. Nusbaum, M., Logistics Plans and Policy Control
Division, (SUP-03Q), 27 March 1987.
6. O'Brien, H., Logistics Plans and Policy Control
Division, (SUP-03Q), 27 March 1987.
7. Johnson, E., Financial Management/Comptroller
Division, (SUP-013), 27 March 1987.
8. Campbell, W., Spares Competition and Logistics
Technology Office (PML550), 26 May 1987.
9. Angelone, J. P., Spares Competition and Logistic
Technology Office (PML550), 26 March 1987.
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10. Rose, A., Spares Competition and Logistic Technology
Office (PML550), 26 March 1987.
C. Naval Air Systems Command
1. Nielsen, G., CDR, SC, USN, BFM H-53/H-46 Helicopters
Program Office, 26 May 1987.
2. Delaurentis, M., CDR, SC, USN, BFM Propulsion and
Power Division, (AIR-536D), 27 March 1987.
3. Klein, L., Propulsion and Power Division, (AIR-53633),
27 March 1987.
Joint Cruise Missile Project Office
1. Nicklas, J. G., LTCOL, USAF, Program Manager, Ship
System Production and fleet Engineering Support
Division (PMA-2823), 6 April 1987.
E. Aviation Supply Office
1. Wilsker, 0., Acquisition Plans and Policy Office,
Contracts Division, 30 March 1987.
F. Ships Parts Control Center
1. Parker, J., Technical Breakout Department (SPCC-
05622) , 31 March 1987.
G. Air Force
1. Cunningham, W. , MAJ, USAF, Of ficer-in-Charge, Product
Performance Agreement Center, Wright-Patterson AFB,
Dayton, OH, 20 February 1987.
2. Sidorski, A., Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-
Patterson AFB, (AFLC-AMPL), 20 February 1987.
H. Naval Underwater Systems Command




1. Paddock, J., Program Manager, Undersea Systems,
General Electric Corp., Syracuse, New York, 21 May
1987.
2. George, B., Technical Division, GTE Corp., Sunnyvale,
California, 17 April 1987.
3. Stone, M., Contacts Branch, ARGOSystems Corp.,
Sunnyvale, California, 17 April 1987.
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APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Acceptance - the act of an authorized representative of
the Government by which the Government, for itself
or an agent of another, assumes ownership of
existing identified supplies tendered or approves
specific services rendered as partial or complete
performance of the contract. [Ref. 1: p. A-l]
Availability Guarantee - a contractual guarantee that the
availability of operational systems will meet a
stated level when measured in accordance with
stipulated procedures.
Commercial Supplies - equipment or supplies that normally
are sold or offered to the public commercially by a
supplier (frequently referred to as off-the-shelf
items )
.
Correction - elimination of a defect.
Cost-Benefit Analysis - the process used to compare the
total costs of a warranty with the benefits to be
derived from the warranty.
Defect - any condition or characteristic in any supplies
or services furnished by the contractor under the
contract that is not in compliance with the
requirements of the contract.
Foreign Military Sales - the selling of United States-
produced military equipment and services to friendly
foreign governments under the authority of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
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Government-Furnished Property - property in the
possession of, or acquired directly by, the
Government and subsequently delivered or other wise
made available to the contractor.
Initial Production Quantity - the number of units of a
weapon systems contracted for in the first program
year of full-scale production. [Ref. 4: p. 46.7-3]
Inspection - examination and testing of supplies or
services (including, when appropriate, raw
materials, components, and intermediate assemblies)
to determine whether they conform to contract
requirements.
Latent Defect - a defect that exists at time of
acceptance that is not normally detected through
routine inspection and that manifests itself after
acceptance.
Life-Cycle Cost - the total cost to the Government for
acquiring, operating, and supporting a system over
its lifetime.
Logistics Support Cost Guarantee - a contractual
guarantee that the logistics support cost of a
population of systems will not exceed a stated value
when measured and calculated in accordance with
stipulated procedures.
Mature Full-Scale Production - the follow-on production
of a weapon system after manufacture of the lesser
of the initial production quantity or one-tenth of
the eventual total production quantity. [Ref. 4: p.
46.7-3]
Mean Time Between Failures Guarantee - a contractual
guarantee that fielded or field-tested systems will
exhibit a stated MTBF level when measured in
accordance with stipulated procedures.
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Prime Contractor - party that enters into an agreement
directly with the United States to furnish a system
or a major subsystem. [Ref. 4: p. 46.7-3]
Product Performance Agreement - a management tool
designed to increase the contractor's responsibility
for the field performance of a product.
Redesign Remedy - warranty remedy that requires the
contractor to redesign the product to correct a
deficiency.
Reliability - characteristic of a system or equipment
that describes its ability to perform without
failure. Reliability is usually expressed in terms
of mean time between failures (MTBF) or probability
of mission success.
Reliability Improvement Warranty - a fixed-price
contractual commitment for a contractor to provide
depot repair services as part of a long-term
warranty, thereby providing an inherent incentive to
correct problems and improve reliability.
Turnaround Time - the time from receipt of a warranted
item at the contractor's repair facility to
completion of the repair and sign-off by the
authorized Government representative.
Warranty Administration - activities conducted to prepare
for, implement, and terminate the warranty.
Warranty Breach - failure to meet the warranty terms and
conditions.
Warranty Duration - the coverage period for the warranty;
may be on an item, lot, or total production quantity
basis.
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Warranty Extension - continuation or modification of the
warranty when the current warranty is about to
expire.
Warranty Implementation Plan - a plan that defines
warranty responsibilities, identifies responsible
participants, and establishes warranty interface and
implementation procedures.
Warranty Price - the price paid to the contractor for
providing the warranty. In cases where a separate
contractual line item for warranty does not exist,
warranty price may have to be estimated.
Warranty Remedy - actions of a contractor to meet its
obligations under the terms of the warranty when a
warranty defect occurs.
Warranty Risk - risks associated with the warranty
commitment.
Warranty Transition - events related to ending a
warranty. Transition may entail a change in
maintenance structure.
Warranty Waiver - a variance from meeting the
requirements of 10 USC 2403 because of national
security interests or because a warranty would not
be cost-effective.
142
APPENDIX C: TITLE 10, SECTION 2403, OF THE UNITED STATES CODE
I MM. Major vessos systems- contractor fusrsntses
(a) lu this section:
(1) "Weapon system" mean* itenu that can be used directly by the armed
forces to carry out combat missions and that cost more than $100,000 or for
which the eventual total procurement cost is more than 110,000,000. Such term
does not include commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general
public.
(J) "Prime contractor" means a party that enters into an agreement directly
with the United States to furnish part or all of s weapon system.
(3) "Design and manufacturing requirements" means structural and engi-
neering plans and manufacturing particulars, including precise measurements,
tolerances, materials, and finished product tests for the weapon system being
produced.
(4) "Essential performance requirements", with respect to a weapon system,
means the operating capabilities or maintenance and reliability characteristics of
the system that are determined by the Secretary of Defense to be necessary for
the system to fulfill the military requirement for which the system is designed.
(5) "Component" means any constituent element of a weapon system.
(f ) "Mature full-scale production" means the manufacture of all units of a
weapon system after the manufacture of the first one-tenth of the eventual total
production or the initial production quantity of such system, whichever is less.
(7) "Initial production quantity" means the number of units of a weapon
system contracted for in the first year of fulPseale production.
(8) "Head of an agency" has the meaning given that term in section 2302 of
this title.
(•) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the head of an agency may not
after January 1, 1985, enter into a contract for the production of a weapon system
unless each prime contractor for the system provides the United States with written
guarantees that
—
(1) the item provided under the contract will conform to the design and
manufacturing requirements specifically delineated in the production contract
(or in any amendment to that contract);
(t) the item provided under the contract, at the time it is delivered to the
United States, will be free from sll defects in materials and workmanship;
(8) the item provided under the contract wul conform to the essential per-
formance requirements of the item as specifically delineated in the production
contract (or in any amendment to that contract); and
(4) if the item provided under the contract fails to meet the guarantee
specified in clause (1), (2). or (3), the contractor will at the election of the
Secretary of Defense or as otherwise provided in the contract
—
(A) promptly take such corrective action as may be necessary to correct
the failure at ho additional cost to the United States, or
(B> pay costs reasonably incurred by the United States in taking such
corrective action.
(e) The head of the agency concerned may not require guarantees under subsec-
tion (b) from a prime contractor for a weapon system, or for s component of a
weapon system, that is furnished by the United States to the contractor.
(d) Subject to subsection (eXD. the Secretary of Defense msy waive part or all of
subsection (b) m the case of a weapon system, or component of s weapon system, if
the Secretary determines—
(1) that the waiver is necessary in the interest of national defense; or
(2) that a guarantee under that subsection would not be cost-effective
TV Secretary may not delegate authority under this subsection to any person who
holds a position below the level of Assistant Secretary of Defense or Assistant
Secretary of a military department
(eXD Before making a waiver under subsection (d) with respect to a weapon
system that is a max"" defense acquisition program for the purpose of section 189a
of this title, the Secretary of Defense shall notify the Committees on Armed Services
and on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives in writing of his
intention to waive any or all of the requirements of subsection (b) with respect to
that system and shall include in the notice an explanation of the reasons for the
waiver.
(2) Not later than February 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense haTI submit
to the committees specified in paragraph (1) s report identifying each waiw made
under subsection (d) during the preceding calendar year for s weapon system that is
not s major defense acquisition program for the purpose of section 139s of this title
and shall include in the report sn explanation of the reasons for the waivers.
<f> The requirement for s guarantee under subsection (b)(3) tppltes only m the
case of s contract for s weapon system that is in mature full-scale production.
However, nothing m this section prohibits the head of the agency concerned from
negotiating a guarantee airailar to the guarantee described in that subsection for a
weapon system not yet m mature full-scale production When a contract for a
weapon system not yet in mature full-scale production is not to include the full
guarantee described in aubsectton (b)(3). the Secretary shall comply with the notice
requirements of subsection (e)
(g) Nothing in this section prohibits the head of the agency concerned from
—
(1) negotiating the specific detail* of a guarantee, including reasonable exclu-
sions, limitations and time duration, so long as the negotiated guarantee is
consistent with the generaJ requirements of this section;
(2) requiring thai components of a weapon system furnished by the United
States to a contractor be properly installed so as not to invalidate aay warranty
or guarantee provided by the manufacturer of auch component to the United
States,
(3) reducing the pnce of any contract for a weapon system or other defense
equipment to take account of any payment due from a contractor pursuant to
subclause (Bi of subsection (bM4).
<4) in the case of a dual source procurement, exempting from the require-
ments of subsection (bM3i an amount of production by the second source
contractor equivalent to the first one-tenth of the eventual total production by
the second source contractor and
f
(Si using written guarantees to s greater extent than requirt-d by this section,
including guarantees that exceed those in clauses* ii. (2), and (3) of subsection (bl
and guarantees that provide more comprehensive remedies than the remedie*
specified under clause- (4) of that subjection
(h M 1 1 The Secretary of Defense shul! prescribe such regulation* as may be
necessary to carry out this section
(2) This section does not apply to the Cosst Guard or U> the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
(Added Pub L 98-.S25. Tide XII. I 1234(a). Oct. 19. 1984 98 Stat 26011
Priar PWrtriuw» ProvuMBt usnlix (o tfca LiflndT Hmon For Ic(»1jii«t history and
tccuon »crt coouined id P\jo.U 91-212. Title purpose of Pub.L 9S-32J. tre I9M I' S Code
VII. | 7*4. D*c I. 1943. 97 Jul 1434 <«et o«t ss Con, »nd Adm New. p. 4174
note under lection 2)04 al tha otic) poor to
rvpeal at lb* Kcuoa by tactica l2J4(bXI) of
Pun.L 9t-ili. e/Toruv* Jan. 1. 1 913
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APPENDIX D: DEFENSE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT
(DFARS) SUBPART 46.7
46.701 Definitions.
"Acceptance," as used in this subpart and in the war-
ranty clauses at FAR 52.246-17, Warranty of Supplies
of a Noncomplex Nature; FAR 52.246-18, Warran-
ty of Supplies of a Complex Nature; FAR 52.246-19,
Warranty of Systems and Equipment under Perform-
ance Specifications or Design Criteria; and FAR
52.246-20, Warranty of Services; means the execu-
tion of an official document (e_g., DD Form 250) by
an authorized representative of the Government. The
above clauses shall be modified accordingly in DoD
contracts.
"Defects," as used in this subpart, means any con-
dition or characteristic in any supplies or services fur-
nished by the contractor under the contract that is
not in compliance with the requirements of the
contract.
46.702 General.
(d) Planning is an essentia! step in obtaining an ef-
fective warranty. To be effective, warranties should
be implemented as an integral part of an overall
design, development, test, and production program.
(e) The acquisition cost of a warranty may be in-
cluded as part of an item's price or may be set forth
as a separate contract line item.
(f) Agencies shall establish procedures to track and
accumulate data relative to warranty costs.
46.703 Criteria for Use of Warranties.
The use of warranties in the procurement of weapon
systems is mandatory pursuant to 10 USC 2403,
unless a waiver is authorized. Policy and procedures
for obtaining such warranties or waivers are con-
tained in 46.770. Acquisition of warranties in the pro-
curement of supplies that do not meet the definition
of a weapon system (eg., spare, repair, or replenish-
ment parts) is governed by FAR 46.7.
46.704 Authority for Use of Warranties.
In contracts for other than weapon systems, the Chief
of the Purchasing Office must approve use of a war-
ranty except for:
(a) commercial supplies or services (see FAR 46.709);
(b) technical data, unless the warranty provides for
extended liabilit> (see 46.708);
(c) supplies and serv ices in fixed price type contracts
containing quality assurance provisions that reference
M1L-I-45208 or M1L-0-9858; and
(d) supplies and services in construction contracts
when the warranties contained in Federal, military
or construction guide specifications applicable to a
given construction project are used. Authority for
use of warranties in the procurement of weapon
systems is stated in 46.770.
46.705 Limitations.
(a) Except for contracts for the production of weapon
systems under 46.770, contracting officers shall not
include warranties in cost-reimbursement contracts,
except for those warranties contained in the clauses
at FAR 52.246-3, Inspection of Supplies — Cost-
Reimbursement; FAR 52.246-8, Inspection of
Research and Development — Cost-Reimbursement;
and at 52.246-7001, Warranty of Technical Data.
46.706 Warranty Terms and Conditions.
(b)(5) Markings. If items delivered under the con-
tract shall be stamped or marked, it shall be done
so in accordance with MIL Standard 129, "Mark-
ing for Shipments and Storage" and MIL Standard
130, "Identification Marking of L'.S Military Prop-
erty." 46.708 Warranties of Technical Data.
A warranty of technical data should be obtained
whenever practicable and cost effective. The contract-
ing officer shall consider the factors contained in
FAR 46.703 in deciding whether to provide for war-
ranties of technical data and whether there should
be an extended liability provision (see 46.770-10).
Particular emphasis should be placed on whether the
extended liability is justified b\ d) the likelihood that
correction or replacement of the nonconforming
data, or a price adjustment in lieu thereof, will not
afford adequate protection to the Government; and
(li) the effectiveness of the additional remedy as a
deterrent against furnishing nonconforming data.
46.710 Contract Clauses.
(0 In accordance with 46.708, the contracting officer
may insert a clause substantially the same as the
clause at 52.246-7001, Warranty of Data, in solicita-
tions and contracts when a fixed-price or cost-
reimbursement contract is contemplated that will re-
quire data to be furnished. When this clause is not
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used, technical data is warranted under the clauses
at FAR 52.246-3, Inspection of Supplies — Cost-
Reimbursement; FAR 52.246-6, Inspection—Time
and Material and Labor Hour; FAR 52.246-8, In-
spection of Research and Development — Cost-
Reimbursement; and FAR 52.246-19, Warranty of
Systems and Equipment Under Performance
Specifications or Design Criteria.
(1) If extended liability is desired and a fixed-price
incentive contract is contemplated, the contracting
officer may use the clause with its Alternate I.
(2) If extended liability is desired and a firm fixed-
price contract is contemplated, the contracting of-
ficer may use the clause with its Alternate II.
46.770 Use of Warranties in Weapon System
Procurements.
This section sets forth policy and procedures for ob-
taining, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2403, certain warran-
ties from prime contractors when contracting for the
production of a weapon system.
46.770-1 Definitions.
"At no additional cost to the United States," as used
in this section, means at no increase in price for firm
fixed price contracts or at no increase in target or
ceiling price for fixed price incentive contracts (see
also FAR 46.707) or at no increase in estimated cost
or fee for cost-reimbursement contracts.
"Design and manufacturing requirements," as used
in this section, means structural and engineering
plans and manufacturing particulars, including
precise measurements, tolerances, materials and
finished product tests for the weapon system being
produced.
"Essential performance requirements," as used in this
section, means the operating capabilities and/or
maintenance and reliability characteristics of a
weapon system that are determined by the Secretary
of Defense (or delegated authority) to be necessary
for it to fulfill the military requirement for which
the system is designed.
"Initial production quantity," as used in this section,
means the number of units of a weapon system con-
tracted for in the first program year of full-scale
production.
"Mature full-scale production," as used in this sec-
tion, means follow-on production of a weapon
system after manufacture of the lesser of the initial
production quantity or one-tenth of the eventual total
production quantity.
"Prime contractor," as used in this section, means
a party that enters into an agreement directly with
the United States to furnish a system or a major
subsystem.
"Weapon system," as used in this subpart, means a
system or major subsystem used directly by the armed
forces to carry out combat missions. By way of il-
lustration, the term "weapon system" includes, but
is not limited to the following, if intended for use
in carrying out combat missions: tracked and
wheeled combat vehicles; self-propelled, towed and
fixed guns, howitzers and mortars; helicopters; naval
vessels; bomber, fighter, reconnaissance and elec-
tronic warfare aircraft; strategic and tactical missiles
including launching systems; guided munitions;
military surveillance, command, control, and com-
munication systems; military cargo vehicles and air-
craft; mines; torpedoes; fire control systems; propul-
sion systems; electronic warfare systems; and safety
and survival systems. This term does not include
related support equipment, such as ground-handling
equipment, training devices and accessories thereto;
or ammunition, unless an effective warranty for the
weapon system would require inclusion of such items.
This term does not include commercial items sold
in substantial quantities to the general public as
described at FAR 15.804-3(c).
46.770-2 Policy.
(a) Unless waived under 46.770-9, after 1 January
1985, the Military Departments and Defense Agen-
cies may not enter into a contract for the produc-
tion of a weapon system with a unit weapon system
cost of more than $100,000 or for which the even-
tual total procurement cost is in excess of $10,000,000,
unless:
(1) a prime contractor for the weapon system pro-
vides the United States with written warranties that —
(i) the weapon systems provided under the contract
conform to the design and manufacturing re-
quirements specifically delineated in the contract (or
any modification to that contract),
(ii) the weapon systems provided under the contract
are free from all defects in materials and workman-
ship at the time of acceptance or delivery as specified
in the contract; and
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(iii) the weapon systems, if manufactured in mature
full-scale production, conform to the essential per-
formance requirements as specifically delineated in
the contract (or any modification to that contract);
(2) the contract terms provide that, in the event the
weapon system fails to meet the terms of the above
warranties, the contracting officer may—
(i) require the contractor to promptly take such cor-
rective action as necessary (repair, replace and/or
redesign) at no additional cost to the United States,
(ii) require the contractor to pay costs reasonably in-
curred by the United States in taking necessary cor-
rective action, or
(iii) equitably reduce the contract price.
(b) Contracting officers may require warranties that
provide greater coverage and remedies than specified
above, such as including an essential performance
requirements warranty in other than a mature fuU-
scale production contract.
46.770-3 Tailoring Warranty Terms and Conditions.
As the objectives and circumstances vary con-
siderably among weapon system acquisition pro-
grams, contracting officers shall appropriately tailor
the required warranties on a case-by-case basis, in-
cluding remedies, exclusions, limitations, and dura-
tions; provided, such are consistent with the specific
requirements of this section (see also FAR 46.706).
The duration specified in any warranty should be
clearly related to the contract requirements and allow
sufficient time to demonstrate achievement of the
requirements after acceptance. Contracting officers
may exclude from the terms of the warranty certain
defects for specified supplies (exclusions) and may
limit the contractor's liability under the terms of the
warranty (limitations), as appropriate, if necessary
to derive a cost effective warranty in light of the
technical risk, contractor financial risk, or other pro-
gram uncertainties. All subsystems and components
will be procured in such a manner so as not to in-
validate the weapon system warranty. Contracting of-
ficers are encouraged to structure broader and more
comprehensive warranties where such are advan-
tageous and in accordance with agency policy.
Likewise, the contracting officer may narrow the
scope of a warranty where such is appropriate (eg.,
where it would be inequitable to require a warranty
of all essential performance requirements because a
contractor had not designed the system). It is Depart-
ment of Defense policy not to include in warranty
clauses any terms that cover liability for loss, damage
or injury to third parties.
46.770-4 Establishing Essential Performance
Requirements.
The Secretary of Defense or heads of military depart-
ments, or delegees, shall designate which features of
a weapon system are its essential performance re-
quirements. Essential performance requirements may
be subsequently modified, superseded or cancelled
by the Secretary of Defense or heads of military
departments (or delegees) when such is in the in-
terests of the Government.
46.770-5 Warranties on Government-Furnished
Property.
A prime contractor shall not be required to provide
the warranties specified in 46.770-2 on any proper-
ty furnished to that contractor by the United States
except for (a) defects in installation, (b) installation
or modification in such a manner that invalidates
a warranty provided by the manufacturer of the prop-





Agency heads may exempt alternate source contrac-
tors) from the essential performance warranty re-
quirements of 46.770-2(a)(l)(iii) until that contrac-
tor manufactures the first 10ro of the eventual total
production quantity anticipated to be acquired from
that contractor.
46.770-7 Applicability to FMS.
The warranty requirements of 46.770-2 are not man-
datory for FMS production contracts. For all weapon
systems procured for FMS requirements, the policy
of the Department of Defense shall be to obtain the
same warranties on conformance to design and
manufacturing requirements and against defects in
materials and workmanship thai are obtained for
U.S. supplies. DoD will not normally obtain essen-
tial performance warranties for FMS purchasers.
However, where the cost for the warranty of essen-
tial performance requirements cannot be practical-
ly separately identified, the foreign purchaser may
be provided the same warranty that is obtained on
the same equipment purchased for the U.S. If the
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FMS purchaser expressly requests a performance
warranty in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance
(LOA) the United States will exert its best efforts to
obtain the same warranty obtained on U.S. equip-
ment or, if specifically requested by the FMS pur-
chaser, a unique warranty. It is anticipated that the
costs for warranties for FMS purchasers may be dif-
ferent from the costs for such warranties for the
United States due to such factors as overseas trans-
portation and any tailoring to reflect the unique
aspecs of the FMS purchaser. Special care must be
exercised to ensure that the FMS purchaser shall bear
all of the acquisition and administration costs of any
warranties obtained.
46.770-8 Cost-Benefit Analysis.
It is Department of Defense policy to only obtain
warranties that are cost effective. If a specific war-
ranty is considered not to be cost effective by the
contracting officer, a waiver request shall be initiated
under 46.770-9. In assessing the cost effectiveness
of a proposed warranty, an analysis must be per-
formed which considers both the quantitative and
qualitative costs and benefits of the warranty. Costs
include the warranty acquisition, administration, en-
forcement and user costs, weapon system life cycle
costs with and without a warranty, and any costs
resulting from limitations imposed by the warranty
provisions. Costs incurred during development spe-
cifically for the purpose of reducing production war-
ranty risks should also be considered. Similarly, the
cost-benefit analysis must also consider logistical/
operational benefits expected as a result of the war-
ranty as well as the impact of the additional con-
tractor motivation provided by the warranty. Where
possible, comparison should be made with the costs
of obtaining and enforcing similar warranties on
similar systems. The analysis should be documented
in the contract file.
46.770-9 Waiver and Notification Procedures.
One or more of the weapon system warranties re-
quired by 46.770-2 may be waived if such waiver is
in the interests of national defense or if the warran-
ty to be obtained would not be cost effective. Waivers
may be granted by the Secretary of Defense, by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Lo-
gistics) for Defense agencies without the power to
redelegate, or by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy
and Air Force with the power to redelegate to no
lower than an Assistant Secretary of the Military
Department. Class waivers may be granted where
justified. Waivers may be granted provided the
following notifications or reports are made to the
Senate and House Committees on Armed Services
and on Appropriations:
(a) Major Weapon Systems. With respect to a weapon
system that is a major defense acquisition program
for the purpose of 10 U.S.C. 139a, before granting
a waiver, the waiving official shall notify the
aforementioned Committees in writing of an inten-
tion to waive one or more of the required warran-
ties. The notice of intent to waive shall include an
explanation to the reasons for the waiver and shall
include an explanation to the reasons for the waiver
and shall ordinarily be given 30 days prior to grant-
ing such waiver.
(b) Other Weapon Systems. With respect to weapon
systems that are not major defense acquisition pro-
grams for the purpose of 10 U.S.C. 139a, waiving of-
ficials shall submit an annual report not later than
1 February of each year that lists waivers granted on
such programs during the preceding calendar year.
This report shall also include an explanation of the








not in Mature Full-Scale Pro-
waiver is not required, if a pro-
a major weapon system not yet
production will not include a
performance requirements, the
II nonetheless comply with the
for major weapon systems.
(d) Processing Waivers, Notifications and Reports.
Each Department shall issue procedures for process-
ing waivers, notifications, and reports to Congress.
At the minimum, these procedures shall specify:
(1) Requests for waiver shall include —
(i) A brief description of the weapon system and its
stage of production, e.g., the number of units
delivered and anticipated to be delivered during the
life of the program; and
(ii) The specific warranty or warranties required by
46.770-2(a)(l) for which the waiver is requested, the
duration of the waiver if it is to go beyond the instant
contract, and rationale for the waiver.
(iii) A description of the warranties or other techni-
ques to be employed to assure acceptable field per-
formance of the weapon system.
(2) Notifications and reports shall include —
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(i) A brief description of the weapon system and its
stage of production, and
(ii) Rationale for not obtaining a warranty.
(3) A written record will be kept of each waiver
granted and notification and report made, together
with supporting documentation such as a cost-benefit
analysis, for use in answering inquiries.
(4) A copy of each notification and report to Con-
gress shall be submitted concurrently to the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Logistics)
For Class waivers, this copy shall be submitted in ad-
vance of the transmittal to Congress.
46.770-10 Special Contract Clauses.
(a) In accordance with 46.770, the contracting of-
ficer shall insert in solicitations and contracts per-
taining to the production of weapon systems a clause
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